The attack on Pearl Harbor has resulted in vast amounts of speculative literature, much of it seen through the clear light of hindsight and, therefore, quite useless. Some have focused on the possibility of a plot on the part of President Roosevelt to get us into war with Japan. Not only has this been unproven but the rationale defies logic. Simply put, there was no motive. Roosevelt wanted us to go to war with Germany, not Japan.
Still, others feel that we had ample warning because we had broken the Japanese codes, which is partly true. We had broken the diplomatic codes but not the military codes, and the Japanese diplomats in Washington were totally out of the loop. They did not know that the attack on Pearl Harbor was coming.
However, there are items of fact that, had they occurred as they were expected to, would have changed the course of the war in the Pacific. The planned final strike on Pearl Harbor by Admiral Nagumo’s fleet is one such item. Admiral Yamamoto had counted on it, and the Japanese pilots wished it, but Admiral Nagumo flinched in the face of success and denied it. He was happy with a partial victory and afraid of losing both precious pilots and his ships should the missing American carriers suddenly show up. In effect, Nagumo stole defeat from the jaws of victory.
1942 is the story of what would quite likely have occurred if Nagumo had been persuaded to let his pilots attack the oil storage facilities, machine shops, and dry docks at Pearl Harbor. Such a seemingly innocuous event and such prosaic targets, involving only a few score planes and resulting in a few hundred additional casualties at most, could have changed the course of the war in the Pacific.
Indeed, many of the changes could have been permanent and vastly to the advantage of the Japanese.
Initially, the changes to history resulting from the final strike would have been small. For instance, I have Admiral Nimitz replacing Admiral Kimmel at a slightly earlier date, as well as Admiral King superseding Admiral Stark in Washington as the extent and implications of the revised disaster become known. Other changes evolve as they would have logically developed as history begins to change.
To simplify matters and make the reader comfortable, I have used the American way of giving the names of the Japanese participants, rather than the Japanese way. Also, I have largely ignored the ramifications of the International Date Line.
And whether what I refer to as the final strike would have been the second or third strike depends on whether one counts the attacks on Pearl Harbor as one or two events.
Everything I’ve written and all the facts, right or wrong, are products of my own research and imagination.
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo clasped his hands behind him and glowered as he looked down and across the flight deck of his flagship, the carrier Akagi. The ship’s crew lined the deck and lustily cheered each returning hero, and it was both astonishing and exhilarating to see how many of the brave young eagles were home from their morning of triumph.
Why then was he so disturbed? The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been an overwhelming success that had exceeded virtually all expectations. He had accomplished everything he reasonably felt that he could. Why then did he have this feeling of uneasiness at what should have been the most glorious moment in his life?
Nagumo felt that he knew the answer, and it disturbed him. He was fifty-five, not too old for active command, but he was a man whose career had been without combat experience and bridged several developing technologies. By training and inclination, he was a big-gun man, a battleship man, a believer in traditional surface fighting. Nagumo had served on destroyers and cruisers, and commanded the battleship Yamashiro before his promotion to rear admiral and appointment to preside over the Naval Staff College. He was not a pilot and had never before served on an aircraft carrier.
But in April 1941, Nagumo had been promoted to command the First Air Fleet, which consisted of six carriers and more than four hundred planes. He had then been tasked to command the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which would launch Japan into a war with the United States. Because of America’s naval might, total surprise was essential to the attack’s success. Nagumo had thought it too risky and had protested. His superior, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, had overruled him, and he had done as ordered to the best of his abilities.
Kido Butai was the name of the task force that included the six carriers, along with two battleships and attending cruisers and destroyers. When it sailed from northern Japan in late November, Nagumo had been cut off from the rest of the world.
