40. Chris Baker and Phasut Phongphaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 194–95; cf. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 235–36: “After a free-fire order was issued by the Bangkok police chief, the campus was stormed like an enemy army’s redoubt, with the . . . BPP troops in front.” This propaganda campaign built on earlier false reports in 1975, when Colby was still CIA chief (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226). Still earlier, in the 1950s, “the CIA and the U.S. Information Service [were] manufacturing fake communist tracts in Thai that attacked the monarchy” (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 124).
41. Robert Harris, Political Corruption in and beyond the Nation State (London: Routledge, 2003), 181.
42. “The Murky Events of October 1973: A Book Proposal Reopens Thailand’s wounds,” AsiaWeek, February 3, 2000; http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/
magazine/2000/0128/as.thai.history1.html). See also Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, no. 3 (1977), in Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons (London: Verso, 1998), 139–73.
43. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 229.
44. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226. Cf. Shawcross, “How Tyranny Returned to Thailand”: “When the Thai foreign minister visited Hanoi in August [1976] the army disrupted his visit by provoking simultaneous attacks upon thousands of Thailand’s Vietnamese residents.”
45. K. J. Clymer, The United States and Cambodia (London: Routledge, 2004), 22.
46. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 174, 182–83, citing, inter alia, Wilfred Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 65.
47. See Peter Dale Scott, “Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of US Asian Wars,” in War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 171–98.
48. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), 94: “With the onset of the Cambodian conflict [in 1979], the Thai Communists were driven out of sanctuaries in Laos and their cause was sacrificed by China to the need to align with Thailand to challenge Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. From that juncture, the Thai Communist movement began to collapse until it had ceased to exist as a viable entity by the end of the Cold War.” Cf. Baker, A History of Thailand, 216–20.
49. Bertil Lintner, “Heroin and Highland Insurgency in the Golden Triangle,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 296. Cf. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 278. McCoy, relying on USG data, disagrees tacitly with Lintner and claims that while Nelson Gross’s statement “was pure media hyperbole, Lo [Hsing-han] had in fact become the largest single opium merchant in the Shan states” (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 424). But Adrian Cowell, a British filmmaker who spent time first with Lo Hsing Han and later with Khun Sa, agrees with Lintner that Lo Hsing Han “was by no means one of the biggest sort of merchants in the business” (Adrian Cowell, Frontline, 1977, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heroin/interviews/cowell.html).
50. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 173–74.
51. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 279–81; cf. Cowell, Frontline.
52. San Francisco Chronicle, July 20, 1973, 18.
