American War Machine полностью

59. “[The U.S. missile attacks] have caused sadness; but the mujahideen network is strengthened by it, not weakened by it. The blood of martyrs will create more martyrs. Because of these attacks, the number of mujahideen brothers has increased, not decreased. The U.S., the enemy, had planned to besiege the Taliban in Afghanistan and terminate the Islamic movement of the Taliban; but after that the mujahideen emerged from this side [in Pakistan]; they could not finish them off. Whenever there is an attack here [in Waziristan], the number of mujahideen swells.” (Mullah Nazeer Ahmad, the emir of the Taliban Mujahideen in Pakistan’s tribal district of South Waziristan, February 2009 interview, reprinted in Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 2392, June 10, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi

?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP239209).

60. Laura Kasinof, “A New Base? Al Qaeda Rises in Yemen,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=7880681&page=1. Erich Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen,” New York Times, June 11, 2009.

61. New York Times, June 2, 2009.

62. New York Times, November 9, 2009.

63. “While the bombers may have been inspired by Bin Laden, a two-year investigation into the attacks has found no evidence that al-Qa’ida helped plan, finance or carry out the bombings, or even knew about them in advance” (Independent [London], November 7, 2006); cf. James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 439: “Trading in hashish and ecstasy was critical to the operation and paid for cars, safe houses, and explosives.”

64. Peter Dale Scott, “‘Continuity of Government’ Planning: War, Terror, and the Supplanting of the U.S. Constitution,” The Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 2010, http://japanfocus.org/_Peter_Dale-Scott/3362; Peter Dale Scott, “To All Readers: Help Force Congress to Observe the Law on National Emergencies!!!” (with Dan Hamburg), March 24, 2009, http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20090324183053848#r7.

65. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 16, 191.

66. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 93, 431. After the final American withdrawal in 1975, Laotian production continued briefly to rise, thanks to the organizational efforts of Khun Sa, a drug trafficker whom Thailand was relying on as protection against the communists in Burma and Vientiane (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 428–31).

67. Peter Dale Scott, “Honduras, the Contra Support Networks, and Cocaine: How the U.S. Government Has Augmented America’s Drug Crisis,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U. S. Narcotic Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 126–27. I presented these remarks at a University of Wisconsin conference.

68. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999, released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, March 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics

_law/1999_narc_report. Production has since decreased but is still well above 1990 levels.

69. Richard Holbrooke, “Breaking the Narco-State,” Washington Post, January 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012202617.html.

70. I use “jihadi salafism,” an admittedly clumsy expression, in place of the more frequently encountered “Islamism” or “Islamic fundamentalism”—both of which terms confer on jihadi salafism a sense of legitimacy and longtime history that I do not believe it deserves. The jihadi salafism I am talking about, with roots in Wahhabism and Deobandism, can be seen in part as a response to British and American influence in India and the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden points to the earlier example of Imam Taki al-Din ibn Taymiyyah in the thirteenth century, but ibn Taymiyyah’s jihadism was in reaction to the Mongol ravaging of Baghdad in 1258. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, history abundantly shows that “outside interventions are likely if not certain, in any culture, to produce reactions that are violent, xenophobic, and desirous of returning to a mythically pure past” (Scott, The Road to 9/11, 260–61).

Select Bibliography

Documents

Church Committee Report: U.S. Cong., Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, April 26, 1976, Senate Report No. 94-755.