Ancillary Mercy полностью

The remainder of the report consisted of mostly padding: a historical study of UFOs, an essay (by Condon) dealing with the 1947-1968 period, a short paper on UFO studies by other governments, and a public opinion survey. Another 250 pages consisted of essays on various problems of “scientific context,” such as perceptual problems, psychological aspects, optics, radar, sonic boom, atmospheric conditions, balloons, instrumentation, and statistical analysis. Several of these papers demonstrated perplexity regarding UFOs, such as one author comment that the reported absence of sonic booms from UFOs in supersonic flight “cannot be explained on the basis of current knowledge.”

The Colorado University report, known more widely as the Condon Report, was massive. At over 950 pages in its soon-to-be published paperback form, it probably fulfilled Robert Low’s desire to “build the record.” Despite its intimidating length, however, the Condon Report suffered from several major failings. In the places where it counted most, the case studies, the report was skimpy. Why, a reader might ask, with eighteen months to investigate, did the project produce so few studies? True, many reports were conducted more thoroughly than Blue Book, NICAP, or APRO had done, but fifty-eight cases is still not much to go on. Of the 550 then-unexplained reports in the Blue Book files, the Colorado Project had considered only three. Also, many of the sightings investigated by the project were poor bets to begin with.

Probably the most striking discrepancy in the report, however, was between its contents and conclusions. Condon had concluded that science could gain nothing from studying UFOs. Yet, the report ended up with a near 30 percent unexplained rate, and a core of cases that came within a hair’s breadth of being conclusive evidence for the reality of alien technology—cases which, under the most rigorous analysis, appeared to be the result of extraordinary craft in the skies.

Ironically, the Condon Report, which rejected so many cases as “lacking probative value,” itself lacked value as a definitive statement of the UFO phenomenon. The fact that it showed most UFO sightings to be the result of natural or conventional causes was nothing new: everyone had known that for years. From the beginning, Condon and Low were clear in their belief that all UFO sightings could be explained conventionally. While Condon chose to ignore the unsettling data contained within the project’s report, he could not hide the glaring reality: the Colorado Project failed to get the strikeout.

REVIEW AND RELEASE OF THE REPORT

Upon receiving the report, officers at Air Force Headquarters began a quick review. On November 15, the air force sent it to the National Academy of Sciences for review by an eleven-member panel, charged with an independent assessment of the scope, methodology, and findings of the project. With little delay, the NAS panel of scientists unanimously accepted Condon’s conclusions and praised the project. The panel stated it was “unanimous in the opinion that this has been a very creditable effort to apply objectively the relevant techniques of science to the solution of the UFO problem.” Keyhoe was not alone in believing that the scientists had either read only Condon’s two opening sections, “or else they had deliberately ignored everything disproving his conclusions.”⁹³

In December 1968, before the Condon Report was released to the public, David Saunders published his own side of the story, UFOs? Yes! Where the Condon Committee Went Wrong. In addition to better timing, the book had other advantages over the official report. Coauthored by journalist Roger Harkins, it was better written. Second, it offered an insider’s account of the workings of the committee, including the biases of Condon and Low, and the dissension that characterized the project. Rather than attempting to make a definitive argument in favor of the ET factor (to which Saunders was certainly sympathetic), the book’s main argument was that Condon and Low never intended to consider a pro-ET solution to the UFO problem, that the project’s conclusions were preordained. Moreover, in the unlikely event that the project arrived at such a determination, Condon would not have published such a fact. Instead, he would have taken it through classified channels.

The Condon Report was released to the public on January 9, 1969; the press had gotten a copy one day before, along with the glowing NAS review. With no time to conduct a careful review, the media read Condon’s conclusions and recommendations, and little else. Critical press comment was minimal, and most of the media applauded the work. With justice, Keyhoe called this “steamroller tactics.”⁹⁴