Interestingly, one of the observers was Charles B. Moore, whose name appeared in the air force’s explanation of the Roswell incident of 1947. Moore launched the balloon at 10:20 A.M. and observed it through a theodolite with an assistant. Accompanying him were five others, including navy men and balloon personnel from General Mills. At 10:30, someone saw a whitish-silver, elliptical object in another part of the sky, and everyone turned to observe and track it with the theodolite, where it filled the scope. The object was “plainly visible.” The men ruled out the possibility of another balloon, having just checked the direction of the wind. They computed the altitude of the object when they initially saw it at fifty-six miles and its initial speed at seven miles per second, or over 25,000 miles per hour (although its estimated speed for the duration of the sighting was 18,000 mph). They judged the object’s size to be forty feet wide by one hundred feet long, but it moved too fast for anyone to identify surface details. The object moved along its major axis and covered the entire sky in about one minute. While in view, the object rapidly dropped its angle of elevation, then shot upward out of sight. It made no sound. The case was reported in detail in True a year later (March 1950).

The air force failed to follow up in a way that inspired the confidence of the observers, who ended up “disgusted” with the lack of a thorough investigation into the matter. But the CIA seems to have been interested in the case. A report in its files stated that the object

was not a balloon and was some distance away ... the flight would have probably gone over the White Sands Proving Ground, Holloman AFB, and Los Alamos.... Information is desired if this was some new or experimental aircraft or for any explanation whatsoever.30

THE AIR FORCE DEBUNKS

On April 27, 1949, the air force released to the public its final report of Project Sign, still known publicly as Project Saucer. Although the data and conclusions were a weak fit, journalists did not read the actual data, but instead took their cue from the report’s conclusions and the air force’s public statement. On the heels of this came Sydney Shallett’s dismissive “What You Can Believe About Flying Saucers” in the April 30 edition of the Saturday Evening Post. Air force intelligence had helped Shallett to prepare the article, which was widely interpreted to be official policy. Indeed, according to True magazine editor Ken Purdy, Shallett “had Forrestal’s backing.” In all essentials, Purdy was right. Since November 1948, the air force had known, with some alarm, about Shallett’s project. An intelligence memo stated the position that “publicity of this nature is undesirable but, if such articles are written, they will be less harmful to the national interest if a degree of guidance in their preparation is exercised by the Directorate of Intelligence.” A memorandum was also drawn up for Secretary of Defense James Forrestal but, according to UFO researcher Jan Aldrich, was probably never sent. Small wonder, as Forrestal was then having problems of his own. Still, the tenor of the letter spelled out the air force attitude well enough:

It appears that articles of this nature would be less harmful to national interests if the Department of the Air Force were authorised to assist the Press in the preparation of such articles as they insist upon writing. It is recommended that the Department of the Air Force be authorised to assist the Press, upon request, in preparing such articles as they insist upon writing.

In effect, the air force was saying, if you insist upon writing about UFOs, allow us to guide you. It personally took care of Shallett’s visit, with predictable results.31

On May 9, Purdy asked Donald Keyhoe to investigate the flying saucer mystery for True, and warned him to “watch out for fake tips” at the Pentagon. At this point, Keyhoe thought that UFOs would probably turn out to be either American or Soviet missiles, and did not seriously entertain the idea of extraterrestrials.32 His opinion changed after speaking with several of his old friends who were now prominent within the navy, including Adm. Delmar Fahrney, a leader in the navy’s guided missile program, and Adm. Calvin Bolster, who later became the director of the Office of Naval Research (ONR). In 1949, Bolster was in charge of the special design section of the Bureau of Aeronautics. He told Keyhoe:

Don, I swear it’s nothing the U.S. is doing. I’m in on all the special weapons programs and I’m sure I would know. Our big cosmic-ray research balloons may have caused a few “saucer” reports, but they don’t explain all the sightings—especially those by experienced service and airline pilots. I honestly don’t know the answer.

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