sympathy with Russia or Communism. I have even less ideological sympathy with Soviet
Russia than I had with the Czarist Russia. But in resisting aggression it is power alone
that counts.”
He then went on to advocate national service and was vigorously supported by Lord
Astor, both in regard to this and in regard to the necessity of bringing Russia into the
"grand alliance."
From this point onward, the course of the Milner Group was more rigid against
Germany. This appeared chiefly as an increased emphasis on rearmament and national
service, policies which the Group had been supporting for a long time. Unlike the
Chamberlain group, they learned a lesson from the events of 15 March 1939. It would be
a mistake, however, to believe that they were determined to resist any further acquisition
of territory or economic advantage by Germany. Not at all. They would undoubtedly
have been willing to allow frontier rectifications in the Polish Corridor or elsewhere in
favor of Germany, if these were accomplished by a real process of negotiation and
included areas inhabited by Germans, and if the economic interests of Poland, such as her
trade outlet to the Baltic, were protected. In this the Milner Group were still motivated by
ideas of fairness and justice and by a desire to avoid a war. The chief changes were two:
(1) they now felt, as they (in contrast to Chamberlain's group) had long suspected, that
peace could be preserved better by strength than by weakness; and (2) they now felt that
Hitler would not stop at any point based only on justice but was seeking world
domination. The short-run goal of the Milner Group still remained a Continent dominated
by Hitler between an Oceanic Bloc on the west and the Soviet Union on the east. That
they assumed such a solution could keep the peace, even on a short-term basis, shows the
fundamental naivete of the Milner Group. The important point is that this view did not
prohibit any modification of the Polish frontiers;, not did it require any airtight
understanding with the Soviet Union. It did involve an immediate rearming of Britain and
a determination to stop Hitler if he moved by force again. Of these three points, the first
two were shared with the Chamberlain group; the third was not. The difference rested on
the fact that the Chamberlain group hoped to permit Britain to escape from the necessity
of fighting Germany by getting Russia to fight Germany. The Chamberlain group did not
share the Milner Group's naive belief in the possibility of three great power blocs
standing side by side in peace. Lacking that belief, they preferred a German-Russian war
to a British-German war. And, having that preference, they differed from the Milner
Group in their willingness to accept the partition of Poland by Germany. The Milner
Group would have yielded parts of Poland to Germany if done by fair negotiation. The
Chamberlain group was quite prepared to liquidate Poland entirely, if it could be
presented to the British people in terms which they would accept without demanding war.
Here again appeared the difference we have already mentioned between the Milner
Group and Lloyd George in 1918 and between the Group and Baldwin in 1923, namely
that the Milner Group tended to neglect the electoral considerations so important to a
party politician. In 1939 Chamberlain was primarily interested in building up to a
victorious electoral campaign for November, and, as Sir Horace Wilson told German
Special Representative Wohl in June, "it was all one to the Government whether the
elections were held under the cry 'Be Ready for a Coming War' or under a cry 'A Lasting
Understanding with Germany.'"
These distinctions between the point of view of the Milner Group and that of the
Chamberlain group are very subtle and have nothing in common with the generally
accepted idea of a contrast between appeasement and resistance. There were still
appeasers to be found, chiefly in those ranks of the Conservative Party most remote from
the Milner Group; British public opinion was quite clearly committed to resistance after
March 1939. The two government groups between these, with the Chamberlain group
closer to the former and the Milner Group closer to the latter. It is a complete error to say,
as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was
solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant. The Chamberlain group, after 17
March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to
adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the
November election on either side of the issue. The Milner Group was anti-appeasement
after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the
territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia.
This complicated situation is made more so by the fact that the Milner Group itself
was disintegrating. Some members, chiefly in the second circle, like Hoare or Simon,