While the currency imbroglio provided the immediate backdrop for these dramatic measures, it was not the central issue behind the blockade. The Soviets hoped to use their stranglehold over Berlin to force the Allies to rescind their plans for a West German government, which Moscow resolutely opposed. The Soviets also wanted to regain the right to extract reparations from the western zones. These were the immediate goals; down the line they hoped to show the Western powers that it made no sense for them to stay in Berlin at all, deep within the lair of the Bear.
Colonel Howley labeled Russia’s decision to impose a blockade “the most barbarous in history since Genghis Khan reduced conquered cities to pyramids of skulls.” His comment was quite hyperbolic, ignoring as it did some rather more barbarous decisions of recent vintage. Moreover, contrary to one of the more cherished myths of the Cold War, the Soviets did not even attempt, much less accomplish, a
The reason for all the leaks was simple: the Soviet sector in Berlin was no less dependent on trade with the West than the western sectors were on trade with the East. Manufactured goods from the West were important to the eastern economy, and the introduction of the Westmarks created an insatiable demand for hard currency in the Soviet zone. Politically the Russians might talk tough, but economically they could not afford to stand on their own. Their tactic of building a barricade and simultaneously undermining it was emblematic of the fundamental structural weaknesses in the Soviet empire that would remain in place until its collapse.
For all its holes, however, the Soviet blockade certainly presented added hardships to the 2.1 million people living in the western sectors of Berlin. After all, many of them were still digging out from the rubble, still contending with poor food and chronic shortages. There was also the fear that the blockade might prompt the Western Allies to pull up stakes and leave, allowing the Soviets to reoccupy the entire city. No wonder Berliners cheered when Ernst Reuter called upon the world to help Berlin “in the decisive phase of the fight for freedom.”
The Western Allies were in something of a quandary about how to respond to this appeal. Official Washington was caught off guard and full of trepidation. George Kennan, head of the State Department’s policy planning staff, recalled: “No one was sure how the Russian move could be countered, or whether it could be countered at all. The situation was dark and full of danger.” France wanted to see what action its partners might take before doing anything itself. Only Britain adopted an unequivocal stance immediately. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced that Britain would neither abandon Berlin nor back away from plans for a separate West German state.
On the scene in Germany, General Clay also appeared steadfast, at least outwardly. Interpreting the Russian move as a bluff designed to frighten the West out of Berlin, he publicly promised that the Americans would not leave. “If Berlin falls,” he said, “Germany will be next. If we intend to defend Europe against Communism, we should not budge.” In private, however, he worried that if Berlin could not be fed, a starving populace would force the Western powers out in order to get the blockade lifted.
