In April 1967 Vice President Hubert Humphrey came to West Berlin to reassure its citizens that America, despite its preoccupation with the Far East, was still committed to keeping the city free. In light of the cheers that Lyndon Johnson and President Kennedy had garnered earlier, Humphrey expected to be warmly received. But a leftist collective at the Free University called Kommune I had other ideas. The communards decided to greet the visiting vice president with pudding-filled balloons. To prepare for this action they practiced throwing their missiles at trees in the Grunewald. Somehow the Springer Press got wind of these exercises and, in banner headlines, warned of “Planned Bomb Attacks against U.S. Vice President.” The activists were arrested before Humphrey arrived, which spared him the indignity of being covered in
For all their provocative gestures, the protest demonstrations in West Berlin remained essentially nonviolent until June 2, 1967, when the Shah of Iran paid a visit to the city. Reza Shah Pahlavi was seen in Berlin’s leftist circles as the quintessential American lackey, but it was not enough for the students to denounce him as such. In line with their tendency to equate all contemporary evils with the sins of their parents, they labeled him “Another Hitler.” Alerted that there might be trouble during his Berlin visit, the Shah arrived with a large security guard drawn from his dreaded secret police, the Savak. When demonstrators shouted “Shah Murderer” at him during a reception at the Schöneberg Rathaus, the Savak went to work, beating the protesters with clubs. West Berlin police did not intervene. Later that evening, as the Shah and his wife arrived at the Deutsche Oper to attend a gala performance of the
Of course, the death of a political protester was anything but routine in West Berlin, and the Ohnesorg case provoked an extended bout of soul-searching. Mayor Albertz, who resigned his office in the wake of the shah riots, later argued that the authorities’ hard-line reaction to the escalating student demonstrations could best be understood in terms of West Berlin’s geopolitical vulnerability.
In the years after the building of the Berlin Wall we developed an extreme sensitivity to everyone and everything that had contributed to the reality that our city was now walled in. We were fully fixated on the fact that this city, in its current condition, could remain free only through seamless cooperation with the United States. . . . In this situation there suddenly appeared demonstrators with red flags and Ho-Chi-Minh slogans, attacking our guarantor power as a destroyer of humanity and freedom. It was hard to take psychologically.
Albrecht’s explanation overlooked the fact that police forces were reacting harshly to student protests in many other parts of the Western world at this time. Yet it was undoubtedly true that West Berlin’s unique status as a walled city, with its shut-in population of self-dramatizing students and short-fused police, made it a perfect stage for the bitterly confrontational politics of the era.
Benno Ohnesorg’s death convinced some in Berlin’s radical scene that the “system” was so rotten that it could not be reformed through the usual parliamentary methods.