Such pleas for the larger view may have influenced some delegates, but mundane matters of money, jobs, and domestic power relationships could not be wished away. Nor could the belief, harbored by many representatives, that Germany’s federal traditions were more likely to be preserved by Bonn than by Berlin. The argument for Bonn was forcefully advanced by the Bavarian CSU politician Theodor Waigel, who also happened to be federal finance minister. Wearing his financial hat, Waigel pleaded for “a politics of just proportions” and economic caution. The integration of the new states was already imposing severe strains on the budget, he said. It was not “small-minded” when, along with the broader historical dimensions, one worried about the capacity of the federal government to function efficiently under the altered political and economic circumstances. Estimates for a move to Berlin stood between DM 30 and 40 billion, he announced, though some predicted twice that much. If sums like this were expended on a move to Berlin, spending on other items, such as social services, would have to be cut. It would be much more sensible, he concluded, to shift the presidential office to Berlin, and perhaps the Bundesrat, while keeping the rest of the government in Bonn.
There were many other speeches that day, and the delegates must have been relieved when, at 9:00 P.M., Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth started the voting on the five competing resolutions. In the crucial duel between the main Bonn and Berlin resolutions, the Berliners won by the narrow margin of eighteen votes, 338 to 320. To the parliament’s credit, the voting was by no means on strict party lines. Schäuble’s impassioned speech seems indeed to have had some impact on his own party, for the number of anti-Berlin votes in the CDU faction turned out to be fewer than in earlier counts. The party came down narrowly in favor of Bonn, 164 to 154. The SPD remained sharply divided, though tilting for Berlin at 126 to 110. With the largest parties so deeply split, the smaller groups had the decisive voice. The FDP voted 53 for Berlin, 26 for Bonn. The Bündnis 90/Greens went 6 to 2 in favor of Berlin, while the PDS came down 15 to 1 for the old capital. The Bavarian CSU, as expected, went solidly for Bonn.
Although relatively nonpartisan, the voting revealed an ominous division between east and west and a great deal of resistance to the prospect of a capital move. Delegates from the new eastern states, regardless of party, voted overwhelmingly for Berlin, while the majority of their western counterparts preferred Bonn. Moreover, given the ways in which internal German relations were to evolve in the next few years, it is safe to say that if the Bonn/Berlin vote had been held any later, the result would have been reversed.
A Wonderful Catastrophe
Cheers and clanging church bells on the Spree, howls of rage on the Rhine. “A Catastrophe for Bonn,” wailed
In the end, the Bonner would prove unable to prevent the capital train from leaving for Berlin, but they would manage to delay the departure and substantially reduce the amount of baggage it carried east. For Berliners, Bonn’s foot-dragging offered yet another reason for self-doubt. Their city was slated to become the new “capital of Europe,” but they had cause to wonder whether Berlin would even become the full-fledged capital of Germany. “Berlin is on the razor’s edge,” declared the architect Hans Kollhoff. “It can be a great metropolis, or it can be a poverty zone. Both are possible.”
Such fears notwithstanding, in the immediate aftermath of the Bundestag’s historic vote, Berliners hailed a decision that promised to make their city a true national capital again, like Paris, London, Rome, and Madrid. In anticipation of this elevation of status, the town became the focal point of a short-lived investment boom reminiscent of the
