Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire полностью

The Russian notion of protection is very broad, as Moscow has reserved for itself almost all its forms in response to various levels of threat. Moscow’s earliest conceptualizations of how to defend its compatriots abroad via military intervention were established in a draft military doctrine published in May 1992. It defined one of the basic tasks of the military as defense of the “rights and interests of citizens of Russia and people linked with it ethnically and culturally abroad.”¹¹⁸ While the final text of the military doctrine, published in 1993, narrowed the group to be defended to just citizens, it still defined “the suppression of the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens in foreign states as a source of military danger.”¹¹⁹ In recent times, Russia’s policies in Georgia and particularly in Ukraine have established two criteria according to which the Kremlin can use military force to protect Russian compatriots. First, when there is a presumed threat to their security (their lives or physical well-being).¹²⁰ Second, when Russian compatriots (but not necessarily their legal representatives) request Russia’s assistance.¹²¹ However, the Russian government has declared on more than one occasion that it seeks to protect Russian compatriots and citizens abroad not only in the face of danger but during any infringements of their “dignity” and “honor.” For example, during the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, Medvedev reiterated that “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country.”¹²² Russia’s use of military force in South Ossetia was also justified as defense of “the dignity and honor of the Russian citizens.”¹²³ Finally, as the case of Ukraine demonstrated in 2014, this protection need not be officially requested or even approved by the compatriots. The Kremlin has seemingly called to protect compatriots in eastern Ukraine from the new government in Kiev by its own decision. For instance, a month after the annexation of Crimea, in April 2014, the Gallup Organization conducted polls in Ukraine and found that only 8 percent of the population in eastern Ukraine responded “definitely yes” to wanting protection by the Russian army. In contrast, 52 percent of eastern Ukrainians responded “definitely no.” Likewise, 11 percent responded “rather yes” while 17 percent responded “rather no.”¹²⁴ While the accuracy of the sample in this or any poll can always be questioned, there was no evidence to suggest that (beyond the small number of separatist insurgents supported by Russian militias) eastern Ukrainians sought Moscow’s protection.

Ultimately, President Putin has regarded any threat to the supranational concept of the Russian World as a pretext for protection. In the case of Ukraine, on June 24, 2014, Putin argued: “We shall always protect the ethnic Russians in Ukraine, as well as that part of Ukraine’s population that feels inseparably linked with Russia ethnically, culturally and linguistically, that feels to be a part of the broader Russkiy Mir.”¹²⁵ As Russian policy experts such as Marlene Laruelle conclude, the concept of the Russian World “serves as a justification for what Russia considers to be its right to oversee the evolution of its neighbors, and sometimes for an interventionist policy.”¹²⁶ In addition, Russian state interests and not only Russian minorities can also warrant protection. For instance, as then president Medvedev reiterated at the end of August 2008 following the Russo-Georgian war: “Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s special interests.”¹²⁷ This statements has been echoed vis-à-vis Armenia, Belarus, and other Russian ally states. However, the protection of Russian minorities or even Russian state interest is not necessarily the end goal of the reimperialization trajectory.