The Joint Chiefs of Staff had established five defense readiness conditions (DEFCON) for the armed forces. DEFCON 5 was the state of military readiness during normal peacetime operations; DEFCON 1 meant that war was imminent. As Kennedy spoke to the nation, the Joint Chiefs ordered American forces to DEFCON 3. Polaris submarines left their ports and headed for locations within range of the Soviet Union. Fighter-interceptors patrolled American airspace with Genies and Falcons, atomic antiaircraft rockets, in case Soviet planes tried to attack from Cuba. Nearly two hundred B-47 bombers left SAC bases and flew to dozens of civilian airports throughout the United States — to Portland, Spokane, and Minneapolis; to Chicago and Detroit; to Birmingham, Philadelphia, and Tulsa. Dispersing the bombers from SAC bases made them less vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Aircrews slept on the ground beside their planes, which were loaded with hydrogen bombs, as commercial airliners took off and landed on nearby runways.
The number of B-52s on airborne alert was increased more than fivefold. Every day about sixty-five of the bombers circled within striking distance of the Soviet Union. Each of them carried a Hound Dog missile with a thermonuclear warhead, as well as two Mark 39 or four Mark 28 hydrogen bombs. On October 24, when the quarantine of Cuba took effect, the Strategic Air Command was placed on DEFCON 2 for the first time in its history. “I am addressing you for the purpose of reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation this nation faces,” General Power said in a message transmitted to all his commanders worldwide. “We are in an advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies…. I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm judgment during this tense period.” Sent by radio, without any encryption, his announcement that SAC was ready for war could also be heard by the Soviets.
One quarter of a million American troops prepared for an invasion of Cuba. Secretary of Defense McNamara worried that, with thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert, something could go wrong. President Kennedy had recently approved the installation of permissive action links. But his executive order applied only to weapons in the NATO atomic stockpile — and none of the locks had been installed yet. U.S. Air Force units in Europe were kept at DEFCON 5, and the readiness of NATO forces wasn’t increased. Any sign of a mobilization in Europe might alarm the Soviets, creating another potential trigger for nuclear war. McNamara also worried that if the United States attacked the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union might retaliate by attacking the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The American custodians of the Jupiters were ordered to render the missiles inoperable, somehow, if Turkish officers tried to launch them without Kennedy’s approval.
The lack of direct, secure communications between the White House and the Kremlin, the distrust that Kennedy felt toward the Soviet leader, and Khrushchev’s impulsive, unpredictable behavior complicated efforts to end the crisis peacefully. Khrushchev felt relieved, after hearing Kennedy’s speech, that the president hadn’t announced an invasion of Cuba. Well aware that the Soviet Union’s strategic forces were vastly inferior to those of the United States, Khrushchev had no desire to start a nuclear war. He did, however, want to test Kennedy’s mettle and see how much the Soviets could gain from the crisis. Khrushchev secretly ordered his ships loaded with missiles not to violate the quarantine. But in private letters to Kennedy, he vowed that the ships would never turn around, denied that offensive weapons had been placed in Cuba, and denounced the quarantine as “an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward… a world nuclear-missile war.”
Bertrand Russell agreed with the Soviet leader and sent President Kennedy a well-publicized telegram. “Your action desperate,” it said. “Threat to human survival. No conceivable justification. Civilized man condemns it…. End this madness.” Khrushchev’s first public statement on the missile crisis was a cordial reply to the British philosopher, proposing a summit meeting. While the Kennedy administration anxiously wondered if the Soviets would back down, Khrushchev maintained a defiant facade. And then on October 26, persuaded by faulty intelligence that an American attack on Cuba was about to begin, he wrote another letter to Kennedy, offering a deal: the Soviet Union would remove the missiles from Cuba, if the United States promised never to invade Cuba.
