putting it together presented more of a challenge: A report issued the following year, even though heavily censored, suggests the challenges of using Fat Man safely. One early assembly method proved to be unwise: “the overhead chain hoists were dangerous due to long lengths of chain striking the detonators in the sphere.” “Nuclear Weapons Engineering and Delivery,” Los Alamos Technical Series, vol. 23, LA-1161, July 1946 (SECRET/declassified), p. 107.
“rebuilding an airplane in the field”: Quoted in Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 590.
Bernard J. O’Keefe noticed something wrong: For the last-minute, late-night repair work on Fat Man, see Bernard J. O’Keefe, Nuclear Hostages (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 98–101.
“I felt a chill and started to sweat”: Ibid., p. 98.
flashing red lights on the flight test box: For the malfunction en route to Nagasaki, see Charles W. Sweeney with James A. Antonucci, and Marion K. Antonucci. War’s End: An Eyewitness Account of America’s Last Atomic Mission (New York: Avon, 1997), p. 209–10.
About one fifth of the plutonium fissioned: Peurifoy interview.
equal to about 21,000 tons of TNT: The precise yields of the atomic bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the subject of disagreement for many years. The rudimentary nature of the measuring equipment and poor documentation of the missions by the United States Army Air Forces created the uncertainty. Estimates of the Hiroshima bomb’s explosive force ranged from 6 kilotons to 23 kilotons. According to the most recent study at Los Alamos, the yield of the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilotons, with a 20 percent margin of error. The yield of the Nagasaki bomb was 21 kilotons, with a 10 percent margin of error. See John Malik, “The Yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Explosions,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-8819, September 1985.
About forty thousand people were killed… at least twice that number were injured: In 1946 the United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated the number of deaths in Nagasaki to be more than thirty-five thousand; the following year it raised the estimate to forty-five thousand. The actual number is likely to be much higher and will never be known. See “Effects of Atomic Bombs,” p. 15; and Frank, Downfall, pp. 285–87.
more than one third of the homes were destroyed: Of the 52,000 residential units in Nagasaki, 27.2 percent were completely destroyed and 10.5 percent were half burned or destroyed. Cited in “Effects of Atomic Bombs,” p. 13.
“bent and twisted like jelly”: The Nagasaki Prefecture Report on the blast is quoted in ibid.
Most of the casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The proportions of various causes of death are speculative. As the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey noted, “Many of these people undoubtedly died several times over, theoretically, since each was subjected to several injuries, any of which would have been fatal.” Nevertheless, an attempt was made to calculate how many people were killed by the different blast effects. Ibid, p. 15.
Flash burns were caused by extraordinarily hot: For the impact of thermal radiation on human beings, see Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 565–76.
“radiation sickness”: For the grim symptoms and survival rate of this ailment, ibid., pp. 577–626.
For decades some historians have questioned: As Michael Kort has noted, the historiographic debate has focused on a number of questions, including: Was Japan already planning to surrender before the destruction of Hiroshima? How much did the United States know about the Japanese leadership’s plans? Was the demand for an unconditional surrender unreasonable? Were the casualty estimates for an American invasion accurate? Did the Soviet declaration of war on Japan — or the two atomic bombs — prompt Emperor Hirohito to accept defeat? Kort’s analysis can be found in Columbia Guide to Hiroshima, pp. 75–116. For the argument that the Soviet entry into the war proved decisive, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005). For the argument that the atomic bombs ended the war, see Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review, vol. 67, no. 4, (November 1998), pp. 477–512. For the American military’s concern that more atomic bombs might have to be used in Japan, see Barton J. Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991), pp. 149–73. For a thorough and complex look at these issues, see Frank, Downfall, pp. 197–364.
“even though we have to eat grass”: The quote comes from “Instruction to the Troops,” a radio broadcast by General Anami. The full text can be found in Kort, Columbia Guide to Hiroshima, pp. 300–301.
