Creature From Jekyll Island by G. Edward полностью

From this conversation and various conferences with Sir EdwardGrey grew the Secret Treaty, m a d e without the knowledge andconsent of the United States Senate, by which Woodrow Wilson andHouse chained the United States to the chariot of the Entente.... Afterthe War the text of the agreement leaked out. Grey was the first totattle. Page discussed it at length. Colonel House tells its history.

C. Hartley Grattan discusses it at length in his book, Why We Fought.

But for some incomprehensible reason the enormous significance ofthe revelation never penetrated the consciousness of the Americanpeople.3

!• Seymour, Vol. 11, p. 399.

2- William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (New York: Kennikat Press, 1925), Vol. 11, pp. 404-5.

3- Viereck, pp. 106-08. This matter, along with the complete text of Sir Grey's memorandum, is discussed in The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan Vol. 11, pp.

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THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND

The basic terms of the agreement were that the United States government would offer to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Germany find the Allies and would then put forth a specific proposal for the terms of that settlement. If either side refused to accept the proposal, then the United States would come into the war as an ally of the other side. The catch was that the terms of the proposal were carefully drafted so that Germany could not possibly accept them. Thus, to the world, it would look as though Germany was at fault and the United States was humanitarian. As Ambassador Page observed in a memorandum dated February 9,1916:

H o u s e arrived from Berlin-Havre-Paris full of the idea ofAmerican intervention. First his plan was that he and I and a group ofthe British Cabinet (Grey, Asquith, Lloyd George, Reading, etc.)should at once work out a minimum programme of peace—the leastthat the Allies would accept, which, he assumed, would be unacceptable tothe Germans; and that the President would take this programme andpresent it to both sides; the side that declined would be responsible forcontinuing the war.... Of course, the fatal moral weakness of theforegoing scheme is that we should plunge into the War, not on themerits of the cause, but by a carefully sprung trick1

On the surface it is a paradox that Wilson, who had always been a pacifist, should now enter into a secret agreement with foreign powers to involve the United States in a war which she could easily avoid. The key that unlocks this mystery is the fact that Wilson also was an internationalist. One of the strongest bonds between House and himself was their common dream of a world government. They both recognized that the American people would never accept such a concept unless there were extenuating circumstances. They reasoned that a long and bloody war was probably the only event that could condition the American mind to accept the loss of national sovereignty, especially if it were packaged with the promise of putting an end to all wars in the future. Wilson knew, also, that, if the United States came into the war early enough to make a real difference on the battlefield and if large amounts of American dollars could be loaned to the Allied powers, he would be in a position after the war to dictate the terms of peace. He wrote to Colonel House:

"England and France have not the same views with regard to peace as we have by any means. When the war is over, we can force them 1. Quoted by Viereck, pp. 112-13.

SINK THE LUSITANIA!

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