Creature From Jekyll Island by G. Edward полностью

Secretary Regan was explaining the inability of those destitutecountries to pay even the interest on the loans that individual bankssuch as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and Citibank had made.

The President was being told what actions the United States "must"

take to salvage the situation.

After the Regan and Stockman briefings, there were severalminutes of discussion before I asked, "Does anyone believe that theseless developed countries will ever be able to pay back the principal onthese loans?" When no one spoke up, I asked, "If the loans are nevergoing to be repaid, why should we again bail out the countries andarrange payment for their interest?"

The answer came from several voices at once, "If we don't arrangefor their interest payments, the loans will go into default, and it couldput our American banks in jeopardy." Would the customers lose theirmoney? No, came the answer, but the stockholders might losedividends.

In amazement, I leaned back in my large, leather chair, only twoseats from the President of the United States. I realized that nothing inthe world could keep these high government officials from scrambling to protect and bail out a few very large and sorely troubled American banks.2

1. New York Times, April 15,1994, p. A9.

2. James G. Watt, The Courage of A Conservative (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 124-25.

BUILDING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

115

PANAMA

The first major score in the game had been made under the Carter Administration when Panama fell in arrears on the payment of its loans. A consortium of banks including Chase Manhattan, First National of Chicago, and Citibank brought pressure to bear on Washington to give the Canal to the Panamanian government so it could use the revenue to pay interest on its loans. Although there was massive opposition to this move among the American people, the Senate yielded to insider pressure and passed the give-away treaty. The Panamanian government inherited $120 million in annual revenue, and the interest payments to the banks were restored. As Congressman Philip Crane observed:

At the time of the Torrijos-backed coup in 1968, Panama's totalofficial overseas debt stood at a manageable and, by world standards,modest $167 million. Under Torrijos, indebtedness has skyrocketednearly one thousand percent to a massive $1.5 billion. Debt-service rationow consumes an estimated 39 percent of the entire Panamanianbudget.... What it appears we really have here is not just aid to atinhorn dictator in the form of new subsidies and canal revenues thetreaties would give to the Torrijos regime, but a bailout of a number ofbanks which should have known better than to invest in Panama and,in any event, should not escape responsibility for having done so.1

The Panama bailout was a unique play. In no other country did we have an income-producing property to give away, so from that point forward the bailout would have to be done with mere money.