That Mossad had been trafficking with the Russian Mafia rekindled a nuclear nightmare that has never quite gone away. While the chilling Cold War doctrine of MAD—mutually assured destruction—had gone, in its place has come a more dangerous scenario where nuclear know-how and materials are on sale. It is capitalism, Wild East style, in which organized crime syndicates and corrupt government officials work in league to create new markets for nuclear materials—a bazaar with some of the world’s most dangerous weapons on offer.
Much of the work of tracing the origins of stolen nuclear material is done at the European Trans-Uranium Institute (ETUI) in Karlsruhe, Germany. There, scientists use state-of-the-art equipment to track whether stolen materials have come from a military or civilian source. But they concede “it’s like trying to catch a thief who has never been fingerprinted.”
To head off undoubtedly awkward questions should Mossad’s own fingerprints be found, Halevy made a secret visit to Holland in early June to explain to Intel Mossad’s role. Dutch intelligence remained unconvinced.
Halevy returned to Israel to tell its new prime minister, Ehud Barak, that Mossad should be prepared to move its European headquarters in the El Al complex at Schipol Airport.
Mossad had been based there for the past six years. From second-floor offices in the complex—known at Schipol as “Little Israel”—eighteen Mossad officers have run European operations. According to one Mossad source, Halevy’s position was clear: Better Mossad moves than be kicked out of Holland, a fate it suffered in Britain under the Thatcher government.
It was Mossad’s decision to run its own operations within a host country without telling Britain that had led to a souring of relations with London. Ironically. If Mossad left Schipol, it may be to return to Britain. Under the uncritical approval of Prime Minister Tony Blair—Halevy is said to have told Barak—Mossad would find a ready welcome. Blair believes a strong Mossad presence would benefit MI5’s efforts to keep track of the many groups from the Middle East who are now based in London.
A deciding factor in a move to Britain would be whether El Al, the Israeli national carrier, also moved its hub from Schipol to Heathrow. Given El Al’s thriving cargo business, the boost to Heathrow would be considerable.
Intel had established that the link between Mossad and the airline is an integral part of the traffic in nuclear materials.
The Dutch agency insists that Mossad would never have begun the dangerous business of buying nuclear materials unless those materials could be safely and secretly transported to Israel.
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Graham Allison, now director of Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs, has observed that “a criminal or terrorist group could even ship a weapon into the United States in places small and light enough to be sent through the postal service.”
Implicit in those words is the fact that a highly efficient organization like Mossad, supported by the vast resources Israel puts at its disposal, would have little or no difficulty in smuggling nuclear materials out of Schipol.
Intel’s suspicion about such smuggling was first aroused when it was tipped off that the El Al cargo freighter that crashed shortly after take-off from Schipol in October 1992 was carrying chemicals.
Since then the agency has gathered what an Intel source describes as “at minimum strong circumstantial evidence” that Mossad has also shipped nuclear materials regularly through Schipol.
A “mule”—a courier—who in return for her cooperation was given a guarantee against prosecution—has told Intel that she had smuggled nuclear materials from the Ukraine across Germany and finally into Holland.
The courier has claimed to Intel that she was met at Amsterdam’s Central Station. Shown photographs, the courier picked out the person. It was a Mossad officer Intel knew was based at Schipol.
In the “old days”—the words are those of Meir Amit—a Mossad operative would never have allowed himself to be so easily identified. Many others within the Israeli intelligence community believe such basic failures in trade craft do not augur well for Mossad as it enters the new millennium.
There has been a change of attitude within Israel that has led to anger and disillusion over Mossad’s operational failures. In those “old days” few Israelis had really minded that Mossad’s successes often depended on subversion, lying, and killing. All that mattered was that Israel survived.
But with peace, of a sort, edging closer to Israel’s borders with its Arab neighbors, increasing questions are being asked about such methods being used in Mossad’s continuing role as shield and sword.
