Throughout the 1980s the organization, having adopted the name of the “Party of God,” kidnapped more than two hundred nationals in Lebanon—mainly American or western Europeans, including Terry Waite, the Archbishop of Canterbury’s envoy. It had organized the highjacking of civilian aircrafts and had more or less pioneered the idea of suicide bombings against American and French targets—killing almost 1,000 people—including 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut and 58 French paratroopers.
By the time the Iran-Iraq War was over, Tehran saw the “Party of God” as a trump card it could play in the Middle East by using it to influence the broader course of regional politics and to wage a low-intensity war against Israel. The emergence of Hassan Nasrallah led to Hezbollah controlling southern Lebanon. Financially it cost Iran very little—no more than one day’s profit from its oil revenue at €50 million a year—to maintain Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah was also funded by income from businesses set up by the movement. These included a bank, a mortgage co-operative, an insurance company, six hotels, a chain of supermarkets across south Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley, a dozen urban bus and taxi companies, and a travel agency that sends tens of thousands of pilgrims to Mecca and other Muslim holy places. Between them they provide Hezbollah with €300 million a year.
The Beka’a Valley had become its power base, centered on the historic city of Balbeck, with its own modern hospital and staffed by Syrian and Iranian doctors and nurses. It also ran clinics, a social welfare system, centers for orphans and widows, and schools—where the syllabus was identical to the one taught in Iran. It collected its own taxes with a 20 percent levy, called
Its relationship with the rest of Lebanon was complex. In May 2006, it still held 14 seats in the 128-seat national assembly, including 2 portfolios in the council of ministers. But Hezbollah also insisted it was primarily “a people-based movement fighting on behalf of the Muslim world.” To reinforce that idea, it has a powerful media department, including its satellite television channel, al-Manar (the lighthouse), which transmitted to the entire Arab world and was regarded by many viewers as better than al-Jazeera. Supporting its rolling news channel were four radio stations, two newspapers, several magazines, and a book publishing house. Its own police force worked within sharia law and Hezbollah courts sent the convicted to its own prisons in the Beka’a Valley.
Mossad estimated its militia numbered nine thousand in May 2006: the well-equipped fighters were backed by an estimated three hundred thousand reservists. It was a more powerful force than the Lebanese-Armed Forces that was supposed to have disarmed it under the United Nations Resolution 1559. That was unlikely to happen, given the majority of the army were Shi’ites and would refuse to fight their own.
Within Iran, Hezbollah’s support bridged the political divides within the ruling establishment. The country’s mullahs, whether “reformist” or “hardliner,” regarded Hezbollah as a reminder of their own revolutionary youth. In the same week that Mohammad Khatami and President Ahmadinejad had delivered their chilling words, the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, had temporarily set aside their arguments to unite in demanding that the Revolutionary Guards should be ready to fight alongside Hezbollah should Hassan Nasrallah call upon them. The deputies had also agreed to send Hamas an “emergency grant as a gift” to counter the freeze imposed by the European Union and other international donations intended for the new Palestinian government. It was Iran’s first move to marginalize Mahmoud Abbas and make Hamas the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In Lebanon, Hezbollah had begun to lean on the new pro-American coalition government led by Fouad Siniora and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader.
