Gideon's Spies полностью

In Washington, however, Olmert knew he could continue to have the support of an impressive number of organizations and individuals who included a number of influential Christian evangelicals—preachers like Jerry Falwell, Gary Bauer, and Marion “Pat” Robertson—as well as Tom DeLay and Dick Armey, who had been majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They were all united in a common belief that Israel’s existence was the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy and was “God’s will.” In their support of Israel, they could count on the support of powerful neo-conservative gentiles like John Bolton, now America’s ambassador to the United Nations; Robert Bartley, the former editor of the highly respected Wall Street Journal; William John Bennett, the former secretary of education; Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former UN ambassador. Between them they had established that in Congress, Israel would remain virtually free of criticism. No nation in the Middle East had gone to war knowing it had such powerful backing.

This must have been a comfort to Ehud Olmert as he was driven in his armor-plated car from his official residence in a Tel Aviv suburb for his first appointment of the day with his generals.

Once hostilities had started, critics—especially those in Europe—found themselves under familiar attack for condemning Israel. The specter of anti-Semitism, never far from the surface, was given a fresh outing. Most of it came from Muslims in Germany and France, which has the largest Muslim population of any European nation. The attacks portrayed Israel in Nazi-like terms, ignoring the incident when a French Jew was murdered in France before the fighting broke out in Lebanon and tens of thousands of demonstrators had filled the city streets to condemn anti-Semitism. Even Jacques René Chirac and Dominique de Villepin had attended the victim’s funeral service to show their solidarity. The attacks in the Arab press had predictably been more inflammatory. From Tehran to Cairo they had been united in calling Israel’s actions “war crimes.” Equally predictable, the powerful pro-Israeli elements in the America media had sprung to its defense. One commentator saw it as “a two-word message to be delivered to other hostile regimes: you’re next.” In case there was any doubt who “next” should be, a radio pundit said: “It is time to turn the screws on Syria.” It was described as “terror friendly” by the New York Daily News, and “a serious threat to the United States” in The New Republic.

The reality was that the Bush administration was now divided over attacking the Damascus regime. While Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were in favor, both the new head of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, and Condoleezza Rice strongly opposed the idea. Hayden pointed out that Syria continued to provide the CIA with important intelligence about al-Qaeda—the “back door channel” had been created when George Tenet had met with Syrian intelligence chiefs after 9/11. The CIA had been given secret access to Mohammed Haydar Zammar who had been identified as one of the recruiters of the hijackers that had flown their planes into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Hayden had argued that to attack Syria, either directly or to allow Israel to act as Washington’s surrogate, would almost certainly end Damascus’s cooperation. Dr. Rice had reminded the president that Syria posed no direct threat to the United States and that an attack would encourage it to foment trouble in neighboring Iraq. “Before any dealings with Syria, it would be sensible to finish our work in Iraq,” she was reported as saying to an aide.

Now, on that July morning as Ehud Olmert was driven from his home for his first early morning meeting with his generals, he was fully aware of how much Washington depended on his promise to destroy Hezbollah and its heavily defended interlocked web of bunkers in south Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley. Mission reports on the relentless bombing raids conducted by the Israeli Air Force were being routed to the American embassy in Tel Aviv and then on to the Pentagon where they were further analyzed. While the State Department saw the bombing campaign as a means to reinforce their encouragement of the Lebanese government to deal more firmly with Hezbollah—a forlorn hope—the Pentagon strategists saw the round-the-clock aerial assault on Hezbollah redoubts as what one former Pentagon official told the author “was a test run for Iran.” The official had added, “the only real on-the-ground intelligence we have was from Mossad’s undercover agents in Iran. While it confirmed much of what we suspected, and had helped us to devise a proper bombing strategy against Iran’s nuclear facilities, we still needed to know how it would play out. The air attacks on south Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley provided such an opportunity.”