Closer to home, what was happening in Iran, ever a matter of abiding interest to Israel, also occupied him. With Khomeini and his ayatollahs firmly in control, it came as a genuine shock to Kimche to see how badly the CIA and the State Department had failed to correctly judge the situation.
But there was a new president in the White House, Ronald Reagan, who promised a new dawn for the CIA. The Agency, Kimche learned from his own contacts in Washington, would become Reagan’s “secret trump” in foreign policy. Heading the CIA was William Casey. Instinctively, Kimche sensed he was no friend of Israel—but someone who could be outmaneuvered should the need arise.
As part of his work, Kimche closely followed CIA operations in Afghanistan and Central America. Many of them struck him as “babe-in-the-wood stuff, old-fashioned intelligence gathering, mingled with some pretty ruthless killing.”
Then, once more, Kimche’s attention was brought to focus on Iran—and what had happened in Beirut.
A few months after Kimche took up his duties at the foreign ministry, Israel had begun to arm Iran with the tacit support of the United States. Israel had provided the help to weaken the Baghdad regime—part of Jerusalem’s long-established tactic of what Kimche called “playing at both ends.”
Three years later, two events had affected matters. There had been the car-bomb massacre in Beirut of 241 U.S. Marines and the growing U.S. suspicion that Mossad not only had prior knowledge of the attack, but that Iran’s intelligence service had helped to prepare it. Pressure was put on Israel to stop supplying Tehran. It increased with the kidnapping, torture, and subsequent death of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut. In quick succession, seven other Americans were taken hostage by Iran-backed groups.
For the tough-talking Reagan administration, which had come into office with its promise to crack down on terrorism, the idea of American citizens languishing deep beneath the rubble of Beirut demanded action. But retaliation was out of the question; to bomb Tehran, as Reagan suggested, was ruled out by even his hard-line aides. A rescue mission would also likely fail, said Delta Force chiefs.
There then occurred a conversation between the president and Robert McFarlane, a gung ho former marine who was national security adviser. Kimche was to recall that McFarlane told him that the conversation went like this:
“What do the Iranians need most, Mr. President?”
“You tell me, Bob.”
“Weapons to fight Iraq.”
“So we give them what they want. And we get back our people in return.”
Reagan and McFarlane—against the advice of Casey and other U.S. intelligence chiefs—took the simplistic view that arming Iran would not only result in the mullahs bringing pressure to bear on the Beirut group to free the hostages, but would improve the administration’s relations with Tehran. There could also be the added bonus that it was bound to weaken Moscow’s position in Iran. The seeds were sown for what became known as Irangate.
Marine colonel Oliver North was put in charge of supplying the arms. North and McFarlane decided to exclude the CIA from their plans. Both were action-oriented men. Their push-and-shove mentality had served them well in Vietnam, and from all they had heard, Israelis were similar men of action. So, in North’s words, “it was time to bring Israel into the fold.” There was also the personal prospect of visiting the Holy Land; a committed Christian, North relished the thought of treading in the footsteps of Jesus.
Israel’s new prime minister, Yitzak Shamir, decided there was only one person capable of handling the request from Washington for help—and making sure Israel’s interests were fully protected. On July 3, 1983, David Kimche flew to meet with McFarlane in the White House. Kimche said he believed the arms-for-hostages deal could work. He asked if the CIA was “actively involved.” He was told the Agency was not.
In turn, McFarlane asked Kimche how far Mossad would be involved : “After all,” he stated, “they are the guys who do all your secret work overseas.” Kimche told him that Yitzhak Rabin, then defense minister, and Shamir had decided to exclude Mossad and leave the entire matter to him. McFarlane said that was fine by him. Kimche had not told him that Mossad’s chief, then Nahum Admoni, shared Casey’s fears that the arms-for-hostages deal was fraught with operational hazards.
