Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis полностью

Hitler had evidently, to Mussolini’s irritation, monopolized their private ‘discussion’. He now proceeded to do the same in the presence of the Foreign Ministers. His rambling tour d’horizon was practically devoid of any genuine substance that might have warranted an urgent meeting.²⁵¹ The Italians, worried that the purpose of the meeting was to force concessions on them to the advantage of France, were glad to learn that relations between Germany and France were unchanged.²⁵² Hitler, his views as always amplified by Ribbentrop, described what he saw as an increasingly critical situation in Britain, speculating on Lloyd George as Churchill’s likely successor and a much more amenable policy towards peace with the Axis as a consequence. He ruled out an invasion of Cyprus, which Mussolini had encouraged. Finally, turning to the ‘Jewish Question’, Hitler declared that ‘all Jews must get out of Europe altogether after the war’, and mentioned Madagascar — a project definitively discarded over six months earlier — as a possible solution.²⁵³ The Soviet Union was noticeable for its absence in the discourse.²⁵⁴

The published communiqué simply stated that the Führer and Duce had held friendly discussions lasting several hours on the political situation.²⁵⁵ The deception had been successful. Ciano’s general impression was ‘that for the moment Hitler has no precise plan of action’. Mussolini, too, so Ciano remarked, was ‘convinced that a compromise peace would be received by the Germans with the greatest enthusiasm. “They are now sick of victories…”’²⁵⁶

When he met the Japanese ambassador Oshima the day after his talks with Mussolini, Hitler dropped a broad hint — which was correctly understood — that conflict with the Soviet Union in the near future was unavoidable.²⁵⁷ But the only foreign statesman to whom he was prepared to divulge more than hints was the Romanian leader Marshal Antonescu, when Hitler met him in Munich on 12 June.²⁵⁸ Antonescu had to be put broadly in the picture. After all, Hitler was relying on Romanian troops for support on the southern flank. Antonescu was more than happy to comply. He volunteered his forces without Hitler having to ask. When 22 June arrived, he would proclaim to his people a ‘holy war’ against the Soviet Union.²⁵⁹ The bait of recovering Bessarabia and North Bukovina, together with the acquisition of parts of the Ukraine, was sufficiently tempting to the Romanian dictator.²⁶⁰ Even to Antonescu, a few days before ‘Barbarossa’, Hitler betrayed as little as possible. His explanation for the coming showdown with the Soviet Union was couched entirely in terms of a necessary defensive reaction to counter the military menace posed to Germany and Europe through Stalin’s expansionism. He mentioned no date. Antonescu divined, however, that one was imminent.²⁶¹ The Romanian leader agreed that a conflict with Russia could not be delayed. The Soviet army would not offer strong resistance, he thought, and the people wanted their liberation. The Romanian people were thirsting for their revenge for the injustices they had suffered at the hands of the Russians. Comparisons with Napoleon were out of place, he said, given the motorization of modern warfare. Hitler rejoined ‘that the aim of the action did not consist of allowing the Russian armies to retreat into their vast land, but that the armies had to be annihilated (vernichtet)’.²⁶²

On 14 June Hitler held his last major military conference before the start of ‘Barbarossa’. The generals arrived at staggered times at the Reich Chancellery to allay suspicion that something major was afoot. Hitler sought an account from each army commander of planned operations in the respective theatres during the first days of the invasion. For the most part he listened without interruption. The picture he gleaned was one of numerical advantage, but qualitative inferiority, of the Red Army. The outlook was, therefore, positive. After lunch, Hitler spoke for about an hour.²⁶³ He went over the reasons for attacking Russia. Once again, he avowed his confidence that the collapse of the Soviet Union would induce Britain to come to terms.²⁶⁴ Hitler emphasized that the war was a war against Bolshevism. The Russians would fight hard and put up tough resistance. Heavy air-raids had to be expected. But the Luftwaffe would attain quick successes and smooth the advance of the land forces. The worst of the fighting would be over in about six weeks. But every soldier had to know what he was fighting for: the destruction of Bolshevism. If the war were to be lost, then Europe would be bolshevized.²⁶⁵ Most of the generals had concerns about opening up the two-front war, the avoidance of which had been a premiss of military planning. But they did not voice any objections. Brauchitsch and Halder did not speak a word.²⁶⁶