Most of all, Hitler was content about the prospects in the East. The problems of winter had been overcome, and important lessons learned. ‘Troops who can cope with such a winter are unbeatable,’ Goebbels noted. Now the great thaw had set in. ‘The Führer is planning a few very hard and crushing offensive thrusts, which are already in good measure prepared and will doubtless lead gradually to the smashing of Bolshevism.’43 Hitler conveyed the same enthusiasm in a morale-boosting speech to almost 10,000 trainee officers in the Sportpalast on 15 February. The world had been opposed to Frederick the Great and Bismarck. ‘Today, I have the honour to be this enemy,’ he declared, ‘because I am attempting to create a world power out of the German Reich.’ He was proud beyond measure that Providence had given him the opportunity to lead the ‘inevitable struggle’.
On 15 March, Hitler was back again in Berlin. The serious losses over the winter made it essential that he attend the midday ceremony on Heroes’ Memorial Day. Only at the end of his speech did Hitler come to the commemoration of the dead. For the most part he offered no more than his usual regurgitation of the responsibility of the ‘Jewish-capitalist world conspirators’ for the war and heroization of the struggle — aimed, he asserted, at a lasting peace.46 He portrayed the previous months as a struggle above all against the elements in a winter the like of which had not been seen for almost a century and a half.47 ‘But one thing we know today,’ he declared. ‘The Bolshevik hordes, which were unable to defeat the German soldiers and their allies this winter, will be beaten by us into annihilation this coming summer.’48
Many people were too concerned about the rumoured reductions in food rations to pay much attention to the speech.49 Goebbels was well aware that food supplies had reached a critical point and that it would need a ‘work of art’ to put across to the people the reasons for the reductions.50 He acknowledged that the cuts would lead to a ‘crisis in the internal mood’.51 Hitler, in full recognition of the sensitivity of the situation, had summoned the Propaganda Minister to his headquarters to discuss the issue before ration-cuts were announced.52 Goebbels had so many problems to bring to Hitler’s attention that he scarcely knew where he should begin.53 His view was that the deterioration in morale at home demanded tough measures to counter it. People would understand the hardships of war if they fell equally on all the population. But as it was — Goebbels’s own class resentments came strongly into play — the better-off were able through the black market and ‘connections’ to avoid serious deprivations. Göring had signed a law banning the black market. But its severity had been reduced through the intervention of the Economics Minister. Goebbels was determined to take the matter to the Führer, and hoped for the support of Bormann and the Party in getting Hitler to intervene to back more radical measures.54
