From Hitler’s point of view, in full concurrence with the opinion of his military leaders, it was high time to act. The order for Margarethe I was issued on 11 March. German troops only — drawn in part from the western front — were to be used; the original plan had foreseen the deployment, in addition, of Slovakian, Romanian, and Croat units.75 The use of troops from their disliked neighbours to install a puppet government would have done little to encourage future Hungarian loyalty to Germany. In any case, at his discussions with Hitler in Klessheim on 26-8 February (at which he had once again, without the slightest prospect of success, suggested putting out peace-feelers to the west),76 Antonescu had refused to allow Romanian participation in the occupation of Hungary unless accompanied by the immediate return of the substantial tracts of territory which Romania had been forced to concede to Hungary in 1940. In wanting to avoid any alienation of Hungarian support after the occupation, Hitler had been unable to agree to this.77 He did, however, eventually concede, again going against the original intention, to the suggestion of Field-Marshal von Weichs that the Hungarian military should not be disarmed as long as Horthy was prepared to go along with the invasion and prevent any resistance.78 And, in a further attempt to avoid unnecessarily provoking resistance by the Hungarians, Horthy was to be given the opportunity to ‘invite’ the Germans into his country, along the tried and tested methods used in Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939.79
Thinking he was coming to discuss the issues raised in his unanswered letter to Hitler of 12 February, in particular, troop withdrawals from the eastern front, the seventy-five-year-old Hungarian head of state arrived at Klessheim, together with his foreign minister, war minister, and chief of general staff, on the morning of 18 March. He had walked into a trap.
Hitler and Horthy conducted their talks in German, without interpreters present. Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, was waiting with his colleagues outside in the hall when, suddenly, the door to the room in the palace where the talks were being held was flung open and Admiral Horthy, red in the face, rushed out, followed hurriedly by a furious Hitler, who eventually managed to catch up with his discomfited guest to accompany him to his rooms, as protocol demanded, before disappearing in a rage for urgent discussions with Ribbentrop.80
The meeting with the Hungarian head of state had, indeed, been tempestuous. Hitler had at the outset accused the Hungarian government, on the basis of information from the German secret service, of negotiating with the Allies in an attempt to take Hungary out of the war. Holding fast, as ever, to his notion that the Jews were behind the war, and that, consequently, the continued existence of Jews in any country provided, in effect, a fifth-column subverting and endangering the war effort, Hitler was especially aggressive in accusing Horthy of allowing almost a million Jews to exist without any hindrance, which had to be seen from the German side as a threat to the eastern and Balkan fronts. Consequently, the German leadership, continued Hitler, had justified fears of a defection taking place, similar to that which had happened in Italy. He had, therefore, decided upon the military occupation of Hungary, and demanded Horthy’s agreement to this in a signed joint declaration. Horthy refused to sign. The temperature in the meeting rose. Hitler declared that if Horthy did not sign, the occupation would simply take place without his approval. Any armed resistance would be crushed by Croatian, Slovakian, and Romanian as well as German troops. Horthy threatened to resign. Hitler said that in such an event he could not guarantee the safety of the Admiral’s family. At this base blackmail, Horthy sprang to his feet, protesting: ‘If everything here is already decided, there’s no point in staying any longer. I’m leaving immediately,’ and stormed out of the room.81
