So little was Hitler a real presence for the German people by this time that, as Goebbels had to note, rumours were rife that he was seriously ill, or even dead.294 Goebbels had the opportunity to speak at length with him at the beginning of December. He found him recovered from his stomach troubles, able to eat and drink normally again. He was also over the operation to his vocal cords, and his voice was back to normal.295 Hitler told him he had come to Berlin to prepare for the coming attack in the West. Everything was prepared for a major blow to the Allies which would give him not just a military but also a political success. He said he had worked day and night on the plan for the offensive, also during his illness. Goebbels thought Hitler back to his old form.296 They broke off their discussion in the afternoon, resuming it at midnight and carrying on until 5.30a.m.297
Operational plans for the Ardennes offensive — known at the time as ‘Watch on the Rhine’, it was later changed to ‘Autumn Mist’ — had been worked out by the OKW in September and put to Hitler on 9 October. The objective of the operation — the sweep through the Eifel and Ardennes through Belgium to the Channel coast, taking Antwerp — was finalized at this point. The detailed plans of the offensive were outlined by Jodl to senior western commanders on 3 November. Sixteen divisions, eight of them armoured, would form the focal point of the attack. SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich would lead the 6th SS-Panzer Army; General Hasso von Manteufel the 5th Panzer Army.300 Without exception, the assembled military commanders thought the objective — the taking of Antwerp, some 125 miles away — quite unrealistic. The forces available to them were simply inadequate, they argued, especially in winter conditions. At best, they claimed, a more limited objective — recovery of Aachen and the adjacent parts of the Westwall, with perhaps the base being laid for a later westward push — might be attained. Jodl ruled out the objections. He made clear to the commanders that limited gains would not suffice. Hitler had to be in a position, as a result of the offensive, to ‘make the western powers ready to negotiate’. On 10 November, Hitler signed the order for the offensive which had been prepared by the OKW. He acknowledged in the preamble that he was prepared ‘to accept the maximum risk in order to proceed with this operation’. The date was set for 27 November, then, in numerous postponements brought about by delays in assembling both equipment and army units engaged in fighting, eventually reset for 10 December.301 Two further delays ensued before the date was finally fixed at
Hitler outlined the grandiose plan of the offensive. Antwerp would be taken within eight to ten days. The intention was to smash the entire enemy force to the north and south, then turn a massive rocket attack on London. A major success would have a huge impact on morale at home, and affect attitudes towards Germany abroad.298 Hitler, in Goebbels’s judgement, was like a man revived.299 The prospect of a new offensive, and of regaining the initiative, had evidently worked on him like a drug.
In preparation for the offensive, Hitler had left Berlin on the evening of 10 December and moved his headquarters to Ziegenberg, not far from Bad Nauheim, close to the western front. Bunkers and barracks had been constructed in a woodland area by the Organisation Todt earlier in the war. Rundstedt and his staff were quartered in a stately residence nearby.303
