And now it all fell into place: the earlier story had been correct, and Himmler’s denial a lie. More than that: the Reuter report had added that ‘Himmler had informed the western Allies that he could implement an unconditional surrender and support it.’99 It amounted to an implication that the Reichsführer-SS was now
Whether Hitler had earlier been aware of Himmler’s tentative feelers towards the western powers through the intermediacy of Count Folke Bernadotte, Vice-President of the Swedish Red Cross and a close relative of the King of Sweden, is uncertain.101 The Reichsführer’s dealings with Bernadotte had stretched back some two months. SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the Reich Security Main Office, had instigated the meetings and acted as intermediary.102 Bernadotte’s initial aim had been to bargain for the release of prisoners — particularly Scandinavians — from concentration camps.103 From Himmler’s point of view, urged on by Schellenberg, Bernadotte offered a possible opening to the West.104 As Germany’s military situation had drastically deteriorated, Himmler, still hesitant and evidently under great nervous strain, had become more amenable to gestures at humanitarian concessions aimed at showing himself in as good a light as possible. Like most Nazi leaders, he was looking to survive, not throw himself on the funeral pyre in the Berlin
Bernadotte had brushed aside Schellenberg’s suggestion — almost certainly prompted by Himmler — that he might sound out Eisenhower about the possibility of a surrender in the West. Such a proposition, Bernadotte had pointed out, had to come from the Reichsführer himself.108 Himmler was, however, in a state of chronic indecision as well as extreme nervous tension. He saw clearly the writing on the wall; the war was irredeemably lost. But he was well aware that Hitler would take Germany down into perdition with him rather than capitulate. Himmler, in common with most Nazi leaders, wanted to save his own skin. And he still hankered after some role in a post-Hitler settlement. As dogmatic as Hitler in the fight against Bolshevism, he harboured the notable illusion that the enemy might overlook his part in monstrous crimes against humanity because of his value to the continuation of the struggle against the mortal enemy not just of Germany, but also of the West. He could not, however, even now free himself from his bonds with Hitler. He still hankered after Hitler’s favour, and was distressed at the way he had fallen into discredit after his failure as commander of Army Group Vistula. Not least: now, as before, he feared Hitler.109
A third meeting with Bernadotte on 21 April, at which the Reichsführer-SS looked extremely drawn and in a highly nervous state, made no progress on the issue of overtures to the West. Himmler still remained ultra-cautious, unwilling to risk any initiative.110 Possibly, as Schellenberg later suggested, he had already decided by lunchtime on 22 April that the time had come to act, though this seems doubtful.111 What certainly convinced him was the news which Fegelein telephoned through to him from the Führer-Bunker that day of Hitler’s extraordinary fit of pent-up fury and his uncontrolled tirade against treachery on all sides — not least directed at the SS on account of Steiner’s failure to launch the ordered counter-offensive — culminating in his announcement that he would stay and die in Berlin.112 At this, Himmler’s indecision evaporated.
