64. Pauley, 206; Dieter Wagner and Gerhard Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. The Nazi Annexation of Austria, 1938, London, 1971, 15–19, 25–6. The relevant section of Schuschnigg’s speech, proclaiming the referendum, is printed in ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 221–2. See also Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/38, Hamburg, 1949, 121–3, entries for 9–10 March 1938.
65. Below, 89; see also Domarus, 818, for Hitler’s post facto comments to Ward Price, a journalist on the Daily Mail who had interviewed him a number of times in earlier years, in Linz on 12 March, that he had acted because of Schuschnigg’s betrayal, which he had at first not believed. Hitler told the Reichstag on 18 March that he thought the rumours of the referendum were ‘fantastic’ and ‘incredible’ (Domarus, 829).
66. Tb Irving, 97 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 102–3.
67. Tb Irving, 97–8 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 103, 105.
68. Helmut Michels, Ideologie und Propaganda. Die Rolle von Joseph Goebbels in der nationalsozialistischen Außenpolitik bis 1939, Frankfurt am Main etc., 1992, 380.
69. Tb Irving, 98 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; see also David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996, 242–3; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 68–9.
70. Kube, 244.
71. Janßen/Tobias, 175–6.
72. Tb Irving, 99 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105.
73. IMG, x.566; Keitel, 178 and n.27; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 51–5.
74. Tb Irving, 99–100 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; Tb Reuth, 1212–13 (11 March 1938); Irving, Goebbels, 243.
75. Tb Reuth, 1213 (11 March 1938).
76. Tb Irving, 101 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 106.
77. Papen, 427; Kube, 244 n.87. The dramatic events of 11 March are meticulously described in Ulrich Eichstädt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler. Geschichte des Anschlusses Österreichs 1933–1938, Wiesbaden, 1955, 378–422.
78. ADAP, D. I, 468–70, no.352 (quotation, 469).
79. IMG, xxxiv, 336–7, Doc.102–C; Domarus, 809.
80. Papen, 428.
81. IMG, ix. 333; trans. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 12 vols., Nuremberg, 1946–9, xii.735.
82. IMG, ix. 333. See Papen, 438: ‘The course of events in the Reich Chancellery on March 11, 1938, revealed the extent to which Goering had become the dominating personality among those who advocated the “total” solution.’
83. IMG, xvi.131–2; Tb Irving, 101–2 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92,106; Toland, 444; Pauley, 208.
84. IMG, xxxi.355–6, 358, 361, Doc. 2949–PS; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, ed. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Washington, 1946–8, v.629–31, 635; Tb Irving, 101–3 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 106–7. Goebbels does not mention the demand to withdraw the plebiscite, and has Göring reporting that all demands were met, then posing a further — and almost identical — ultimatum for half an hour later. His own entry appears garbled.
85. Pauley, 208.
86. NCA, v.970, 982, D0C.3254–PS; see also IMG, xvi.199 (testimony of Michael Skubl, pointing out Seyß’s embarrassed stance, and the impression he gave of being led rather than leading).
87. Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
88. See Below, 89, who was told on returning to the Reich Chancellery on the early evening of 11 March that the next day ‘Austria will be coordinated’.
89. DBFP, Series 3,1, 13, Doc. 25.
90. Geyl, 189.
91. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
92. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
93. Below, 89–90.
94. Shirer, Berlin Diary 82–3.
