86. Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months. Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution, New York/London, 1985, 26; Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office, 58.
87. An inference of Aly, 306.
88. Overy, Russia’s War, 232–3; Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, London, 1998, 276–7; Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, London, 1970, 59–66, 107–9.
89. Longerich, Politik, 429.
90. TBJG, II/2, 385 (9 September 1941).
91. H.D. Heilmann, ‘Aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Diplomaten Otto Brautigam’, in Biedermann und Schreibtischtäter. Materialien zur deutschen Täter-Biographie, ed. Götz Aly, Berlin, 2nd edn, 1989, 123–87, here 144–5 (entry for 14 September 1941); Adler, 176–7; Peter Witte, ‘Two Decisions concerning the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question”: Deportations to Lodz and Mass Murder in Chelmno’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 9 (1995), 293–317, here 330; see also Burrin, 122; Longerich, Politik, 429–30.
92. Adler, 176–7; Witte, ‘Two Decisions’, 330; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Herrschaft. Vollzug einer Weltanschauung, (1986), Stuttgart, 1988, 116; Burrin, 122; Longerich, Politik, 430 and 699 n.45.
93. Koeppen, Fol.21 (Bericht Nr.34, Blatt 2–3, 20 September 1941). Koeppen was almost certainly uninformed at this point of the steps which had by then already been taken two days earlier. His entry probably, therefore, reflects his understanding of Hitler’s stance several days earlier. (See Longerich, Politik, 431.)
94. The emphasis placed on the Atlantic Charter as the cause of a fundamental shift in Hitler’s policy towards the Jews, allegedly bringing the decision for the ‘Final Solution’, by Jersak, 341ff., 349ff., (see above, n.75) seems exaggerated.
95. See Longerich, Politik, 431–2.
96. See Haider KTB, iii.226 (13 September 1941), for the OKW memorandum of 13 September 1941, approved by Hitler, indicating for the first time that the war was likely to last over the winter. The victory at Kiev temporarily restored Hitler’s confidence, a few days later, that an early end to the campaign was in prospect (TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941)).
97. Dienstkalender, 211.
98. Longerich, 430; Witte, ‘Two Decisions’, 330; Dienstkalender, 213 and n.57.
99. Longerich, Ermordung, 157. The figure of 60,000 Jews was the same as that mentioned in at least two earlier references to deportation — that of the Viennese Jews in the winter of 1940–41, and by Eichmann at a meeting in the Propaganda Ministry in March. It seems to have been plucked from thin air. The actual number agreed on, following hard bargaining between Eichmann and the regional authorities in the Warthegau, was 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies, whom Eichmann seems to have accommodated in the demands for deportation following pressure from the local Nazi authorities in the Burgenland. (Saffrian, 115–19; Michael Zimmermann, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Lösung der Zigeunerfrage’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 235–62, here 248–9.) As Zimmermann (237–8) points out, the murder of the Gypsies took place without Hitler ever showing notable interest in the ‘Gypsy question’; nor was a pre-existing programme for their persecution and extermination devised, either by Himmler or Heydrich. (Michael Zimmermann, Verfolgt, vertrieben, vernichtet. Die nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik gegen Sinti und Roma, Essen, 1989, 82–3, where the numbers of Roma and Sinti murdered is estimated at between 220,000 and 500,000.)
100. The connections with genocide have been well brought out by Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völker-mord, 167–257; and Christian Gerlach, ‘Deutsche Wirtschaftsinteressen, Besatzungspolitik und der Mord an den Juden in Weitßrutßland, 1941–1943’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 263–91.
101. See Herbert, ‘Labour and Extermination’, 167ff., for the sensitivity of the labour question in the unfolding of anti–Jewish policy at this juncture.
102. TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941).
