49. TBJG, II/12, 354–5 (24 May 1944).
50. Speer, 374–8, quotation 377.
51. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944).
52. Speer, 378; Heinz Dieter Hölsken, Die V-Waffen. Entstehung-Propaganda-Kriegseinsatz, Stuttgart, 1984, 142.
53. Irving, HW, 609.
54. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944). Jodl told the Gauleiter later that month that the retaliation would finally begin in mid-April (TBJG, II/11, 347 (25 February 1944).
55. Irving, 609.
56. Below, 363.
57. Below, 363; and see Hoffmann, Security, 229–32, 241–4.
58. Hauner, 188; Irving, HW, 607; both have Hitler leaving on 23 Feb., but Morell’s diary records that he took the train on the evening of 22 February (Irving, Doctor, 129). TBJG, II/11, 332 (23 March 1944), for Hitler’s notification that he would speak in Munich. Goebbels, in referring to Hitler’s intention to come to Munich, offered an implicit criticism in the very next lines of his diary entry by noting that it would be good if the Führer were to visit Berlin or another city that had suffered from the bombing. So far he had not visited a single such city, and ‘that cannot be sustained in the long run’.
59. Schenck, 352, 391; Irving, Doctor, 128–9; Redlich, 346; TBJG, II/11, 297 (16 February 1944).
60. Irving, Doctor, 131–2; Redlich, 228–9, 346; Schenck, 308.
61. Irving, Doctor, 131; Redlich, 346; Schenck, 382ff.
62. TBJG, II/11, 346–7 (25 February 1944).
63. TBJG, II/11, 347–8 (25 February 1944).
64. Irving, Doctor, 129; TBJG, II/11, 349 (25 February 1944).
65. TBJG, II/11, 408–9 (4 March 1944); Irving, Doctor, 129; Irving, HW, 608. For the building of the underground passages, see Josef Geiss, Obersalzberg. The History of a Mountain, Berchtes-gaden, n.d. (1955), 147–56; and Hanisch, 35. By 1944, British intelligence had built up a surprisingly detailed knowledge of the layout of the Berghof, devised with the intention of a possible assassination attempt there on Hitler. (Operation Foxley: the British Plan to Kill Hitler, London, 1998, 87ft (for security arrangements), 100–101 (for the air-raid shelters).)
66. TBJG, II/11, 389 (3 March 1944).
67. Hauner, Hitler, 194. The armistice between Finland and the Allies was concluded on 19 September 1944: German troops had to leave Finland within two weeks.
68. TBJG, II/11, 397–8 (4 March 1944).
69. The amphibious landing had taken the German forces by surprise. But the Allied commanders had not seized the opportunity to advance, and the consolidation of their position allowed Kesselring time to marshal no fewer than six divisions to surround the Allied perimeter. Heavy fighting continued throughout February, and it was spring before the Allies, by now heavily reinforced, were able to break out. Allied losses totalled over 80,000 men (with some 7,000 killed); German losses were estimated at 40,000 (including around 5,000 killed). (Churchill, V. ch. xxvii; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 188–91; Weinberg III, 661; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 231; Oxford Companion, 45–6.)
70. TBJG, II/11, 399–400 (4 March 1944).
71. TBJG, II/11, 400 (4 March 1944).
72. TBJG, II/11, 401 (4 March 1944).
73. TBJG, II/11, 403 (4 March 1944).
74. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 248–9; Bloch, 398–9; Weinberg III, 671–2; Irving, HW, 611.
75. Warlimont, 412; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249; Irving, HW, 611.
76. Schmidt, 587.
77. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249. When they met again on 23 March, Hitler told Antonescu — something the Romanian leader had long been waiting to hear — that Germany was renouncing its commitment to the territorial settlement of 30 August 1940 on account of Hungary’s disloyalty, but requested him to keep this confidential for the time being. The announcement of this step which Hitler promised Antonescu never materialized (Staatsmänner II, 391–2).
78. Warlimont, 413.
79. Bloch, 399.
80. Schmidt, 587–8.
81. Domarus, 2091; also IfZ, ZS Eichmann 807, Fol.2703 (Eichmann-Prozeß, Beweisdokumente: Horthys Aussage am 4.März 1948 über Treffen mit Hitler in Klessheim).
82. Schmidt, 587–9; also Irving, HW, 612–13; Bloch, 399–400.
83. When speaking to his party leaders on 17 April, Hitler told them that raw materials and manpower would be available from Hungary. ‘In particular,’ noted Goebbels, ‘he wants to put the 700,000 Jews in Hungary to activity useful for our war purposes’ (TBJG, II/12, 137 (18 April 1944)). Even before his party leaders, Hitler held to the fiction that the Jews were being put to work (though the wording, as Goebbels reported it, was ambiguous). In fact, more than half of them were deported within three months to Auschwitz.
84. Longerich, Ermordung, 322 — 4.
