136. Jodl’s summary for Hitler of advantages and disadvantages of leaving the Geneva Convention argued that the way would then be clear for Allied usage of gas and chemical warfare at a time when they enjoyed obvious air-superiority; also that there were more German prisoners in Allied hands than Allied prisoners-of-war in Germany, so that massive retaliation would also be to Germany’s disadvantage. (IMG, xxxv.181–6, doc.606-D. See also IMG, ix.434, x.342, xiii.517–18, xvi.542, xviii.397–8, and xxxiiii.641–4, doc.158-C.)
137. Descriptions by Dr Giesing, in mid-February, and Percy Ernst Schramm a month later: Maser, 394–5, cit. Giesing report of 12 June 1945, 175ff.; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militärischer Führer. Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacbt, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, 134ff.; KTB OKW, iv/2, 1701–2. See also Irving, HW, 772–3; Irving, Doctor, 211.
138. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten. Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, 253.
139. Below, 402. Goebbels had remarked in his diary, early in February, that the Gauleiter had not been taking central directions from Berlin seriously and were running things in their own way (TBJG, II/15, 311 (5 February 1945)).
140. Jordan, 251–8; Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’. Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, 384–92 (where the meeting is wrongly dated to 25 February); Below, 402; Martin Moll, ‘Die Tagungen der Reichs — und Gauleiter der NSDAP: Ein verkanntes Instrument der Koordinierung im “Amterchaos” des Dritten Reiches?’, typescript, 60–61 (with best thanks to Dr Moll for the opportunity to see this valuable, as yet unpublished, paper); Irving, HW, 772–3; Toland, Adolf Hitler, 855 (based on oral testimony in 1971 of three Gauleiter present). The formal communiqué of the meeting confined itself to stating that Hitler had imparted to the Gauleiter ‘the guidelines for the victorious continuation of the struggle, for the comprehensive organization of all forces of resistance, and for the ruthless deployment of the Party in the fateful struggle of the German people’ (Domarus, 2207). In individual cases, Hitler was nevertheless even now able to rouse new hope. According to Christa Schroeder, Albert Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig-West Prussia, came to Berlin in March 1945 determined to tell Hitler the unvarnished truth about the desolate situation in Danzig. He came out of his audience reinvigorated, saying ‘he has told me he will save Danzig, and about that there can be no more doubt’ (Schroeder, 74).
141. Domarus, 2203–6. Domarus (2202, n.71, 2088) mistakenly thought the occasion had been dropped altogether in 1944. In fact, Hitler had given a speech on that occasion (24 February 1944), which Goebbels had described as ‘extraordinarily fresh’ (TBJG, II/11, 347 (25 February 1944)). In 1942, the Gauleiter of Munich and Upper Bavaria, Adolf Wagner, had read out a proclamation by Hitler (TBJG, II/3, 371 (25 February 1942)); in 1943, Hermann Esser read out the proclamation (TBJG, II/7, 412 (25 February 1943)).
142. StA Munich, LRA 29656, report of the SD-Auβenstelle Berchtesgaden, 7 February 1945: ‘… während bei der überwiegenden Zahl der Volksgenossen der Inhalt der Proklamation vorbei-rauschte wie der Wind in leerem Geäst’. Other reports underlined the impression that Hitler’s address had been unable to lift the mood and found no echo among the mass of the population (GStA, Munich, MA 106695, reports of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 7 March 1945, 7 April 1945). Some reports from mid-February noted that hope of a miracle was now confined to belief in Hitler himself (Volker Berghahn, ‘Meinungsforschung im “Dritten Reich”: Die Mundpro-paganda-Aktion der Wehrmacht im letzten Kriegshalbjahr’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1 (1967), 83–119, here 105.
