Hall R.E., Jones C.I. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker Than Others? // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999. Vol. 114 (Feb.). P 83-116.
Hamilton G.G. The Organizational Foundations of Western and Chinese Commerce: A Historical and Comparative Analysis / G.G. Hamilton (ed.). Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies. 1991. P 48–65.
Hanawalt B. The Peasant Family and Crime in Fourteenth-Century England // Journal of British Studies. 1974. Vol. 13. No. 2. P 1-18.
Hardin R. Why a Constitution / B. Grofman, D. Wittman (eds.). The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. N.Y.: Agathon Press. 1989. Р. 100–120.
Hardin R. Economic Theories of the State / D.C. Mueller (ed.). Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997. Р. 21–34.
Hart O. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Hart O. Norms and the Theory of the Firm. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 2001. Vol. 149. No. 6. P 1701–1715.
Hart O., Holmstrom B. The Theory of Contracts / T.F. Bewley (ed.). Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. P 71-157.
Hart O., Moore J. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts // Review of Economic Studies. 1999. Vol. 66. No. 1. P 115–138.
Hatcher J., Bailey M. Modeling the Middle Ages: The History and Theory of England’s Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Hayek F.A. Economics and Knowledge // Economica. 1937. Vol. 4. P 33–54.
Hayek F.A. Law Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Hayek F.A. Law Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976.
Hayek F.A. Law Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 3. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979.
Hearder H., Waley D.P. (eds). A Short History of Italy from Classical Times to the Present Day. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
Hechter M. The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real World Collective Action Problems // Rationality and Society. 1992. Vol. 4. No. 1. P 33–40.
Heers J. Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Helpman E. The Mystery of Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H. Foundations of Human Sociality: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Henrich J., Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R. In Search for Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies // American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 74 (May). P 73-8.
Herb M. Taxation and Representation. Studies in Comparative International Development. 2003. Vol. 8. No. 3. P 3-31.
Herlihy D. The Agrarian Revolution in Southern France and Italy, 801-1150: Speculum // Journal of Mediaeval Studies. 1958. Vol. 33. No. 1. P 23–42.
Herlihy D. Family Solidarity in Medieval Italian History / D. Herlihy, R.S. Lopez, V. Slessarev (eds). Economy Society, and Government in Medieval Italy: Essays in Memory of Robert L. Reynolds. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1969. P 173–184.
Heyd W. Le colonie commerciali degli Italiani in Oriente nel Medio Evo. 2 vols. Venice: G. Antonelli, 1868.
Heyd W. Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-age. 2 vols. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1885.
Heywood W. A History of Pisa, Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.
Hicks J. A Theory of Economic History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Hickson C.R., Thompson E.A. A New Theory of Guilds and European Economic Development // Explorations in Economic History. 1991. Vol. 28. No. 2. P 127–168.
Hirshleifer J. The Expanding Domain of Economics // American Economic Review. 1985. Vol. 75. No. 6. P 53–70.
Hodgson G.M. The Approach of Institutional Economics // Journal of Economic Literature. 1998. Vol. 36. No. 1. P 166–192.
Hodgson M.G.S. The Venture of Islam. Vols. 1, 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
Hoffman E., McCabe K., Shachat K., Smith V. Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games // Games and Economic Behavior. 1994. Vol. 7. No. 3. P 346–380.
Hoffman E., McCabe K., Smith V. On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games // International Journal of Game Theory. 1996a. Vol. 125. No. 3. P 289–301.
