123 See, for example, this collaboration between CNN and Clemson University investigating a Russian troll factory in Ghana: Clarissa Ward, “Inside a Russian Troll Factory in Ghana,” CNN, March 12, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2020/03/12/russian-trolls-ghana-ward-pkg-vpx.cnn.
124 Miles Klee, “Twitter Fires Election Integrity Team Ahead of 2024 Elections,” Rolling Stone, September 27, 2023, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/twitter-elon-musk-fires-safety-team-2024-elections-1234832199.
125 Kate Starbird, Ahmer Arif, and Tom Wilson, “Disinformation as Collaborative Work,” Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3, no. CSCW (November 7, 2019): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1145/3359229.
126 Samantha Bradshaw, Renée DiResta, and Carly Miller, “Playing Both Sides: Russian State-Backed Media Coverage of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement,” International Journal of Press/Politics, February 28, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612221082052.
127 Stanford Internet Observatory Team, “Digital Street Conflict,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, June 3, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/digital-street-conflict.
128 Amanda Seitz, Eric Tucker, and Mike Catalini, “How China’s TikTok, Facebook Influencers Push Propaganda,” AP News, March 30, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/china-tiktok-facebook-influencers-propaganda-81388bca676c560e02a1b493ea9d6760.
129 Vincent Ni, “China Hires Western TikTokers to Polish Its Image During 2022 Winter Olympics,” The Guardian, January 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/22/china-hires-western-tiktokers-to-polish-its-image-during-2022-winter-olympics.
130 David Gilbert, “Russian TikTok Influencers Are Being Paid to Spread Kremlin Propaganda,” Vice, March 11, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/epxken/russian-tiktok-influencers-paid-propaganda.
131 See, for example, Henry John Farrell and Bruce Schneier, “Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy,” SSRN Electronic Journal, November 17, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3273111: “Election security does not simply involve physical infrastructure, such as ballots and polling booths. It also involves roughly consensual expectations about how the system works, who won and who lost, and so on. If an attacker does not penetrate the physical election infrastructure, but does successfully subvert the shared expectations around the election, she can nevertheless succeed.”
132 See Yochai Benkler, “The Danger of Overstating the Impact of Information Operations,” Lawfare, October 23, 2020, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/danger-overstating-impact-information-operations: “If the objective of the campaign is to sow doubt and confusion, to make Americans believe that we have been infiltrated and that Russia is an all-powerful actor messing with our democracy, then overstating the importance of the campaign simply reinforces and executes the Russian plan.”
133 Josh A. Goldstein and Renée DiResta, “Foreign Influence Operations and the 2020 Election: Framing the Debate,” Lawfare, October 23, 2020, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/foreign-influence-operations-and-2020-election-framing-debate.
134 The US District Court for the District of Columbia, “Indictment Criminal No. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2,371, 1349, 1028A),” US Department of Justice, February 16, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1035562/download.
135 Gregory Eady et al., “Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency Foreign Influence Campaign on Twitter in the 2016 US Election and Its Relationship to Attitudes and Voting Behavior,” Nature Communications 14, no. 62 (2023): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-35576-9.
136 Marshall Cohen, “Access Hollywood, Russian Hacking and the Podesta Emails: One Year Later,” CNN, October 7, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/07/politics/one-year-access-hollywood-russia-podesta-email/index.html.
137 “Launching the SIO Virality Project,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, May 21, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/launching-sio-virality-project.
138 “Iran Leader Refuses US Help; Cites Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/23/iran-leader-refuses-us-help-cites-coronavirus-conspiracy-theory.
139 Shelby Grossman, “Virality Project: Saudi Arabia State Media and COVID-19,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, June 24, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/saudi-arabia-state-media-and-covid-19.
140 Maggie Michael, “Yemen’s Rebels Crack Down as COVID-19 and Rumors Spread,” AP News, June 9, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-health-yemen-ap-top-news-virus-outbreak-677a1fc12d864cd37eea57e5f71614a2.
141 Daniel Bush, “Virality Project (Russia): Penguins and Protests,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, June 9, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/penguins-and-protests-rt-and-coronavirus-pandemic.
142 DiResta et al., “Telling China’s Story.”
