WHEN VLADIMIROV translated Dimitrov’s cable to him on 2 January 1944, Mao’s immediate reaction was one of defiance. He wrote an answer there and then. It was a blunt, point-by-point retort:
To Comrade Dimitrov,
1. We have not curtailed the anti-Japanese struggle. On the contrary …
2. Our line as regards collaboration with the [Nationalists] remains unchanged …
3. Our relations with Chou En-lai are good. We are not going to cut him off from the Party at all. Chou En-lai has made great progress.
4. Wang Ming has been engaged in various anti-Party activities …
5. I assure you and can guarantee that the Chinese Communist Party loves and highly respects Comrade Stalin and the Soviet Union …
6. … Wang Ming is not trustworthy. He was once arrested in Shanghai. Several people have said that when he was in prison he admitted to being a member of the Communist Party. He was released after this. There has also been talk about his suspicious connections with Mif [purged in Russia] …
Kang Sheng is a trustworthy man …
Mao was an impulsive man, but he usually held his impulses at bay. He once told staff who commented on his “unruffled calm” and “impeccable self-control”: “It’s not that I am not angry. Sometimes I am so angry I feel my lungs are bursting. But I know I must control myself, and not show anything.”
Mao’s hair-trigger reaction on this occasion was uncharacteristic. The reason he exploded was not that he cared so much for his son, but because this was the first time Moscow tried to blackmail him. But he instantly regretted his eruption. He could not afford to offend Moscow, especially now that the tide had turned against Germany, and Russia was likely to move against Japan soon — and sweep him to power.
Next day, Mao told Vladimirov he “had given much thought” to Dimitrov’s telegram, and asked if his answer had been sent. If not, “he certainly would change its content.”
But the cable had gone off, and over the following days a visibly anxious Mao set out to woo Vladimirov. On 4 January, he invited Vladimirov to an operatic show, and “immediately began speaking of his respect for the Soviet Union … and I. V. Stalin … Mao said he sincerely respected the Chinese comrades who had received education or worked in the USSR …” Next day, Mao called on Vladimirov again: “apparently he understands,” Vladimirov noted, “that the telegram he sent to Dimitrov on January 2 was rude and ill-considered.” On the 6th, Mao threw a dinner for the Russians: “Everything was ceremonious, friendly and … servile.” The following day, Mao came alone to Vladimirov’s place at 9:00 AM — for him, the middle of the night. “Suddenly,” Mao “began to speak of Wang Ming — in an entirely different, almost friendly tone!” At the end, Mao sat down and wrote another telegram to Dimitrov, and asked Vladimirov to “tick it out” at once. “Mao looked perturbed, his gestures betraying tension and nervousness … He looked extremely tired, as if he hadn’t had a minute’s sleep.”
The tone of the second telegram was groveling:
I sincerely thank you for the instructions you gave me. I shall study them thoroughly … and take measures according to them … Regarding inner-Party questions, our policy is aimed at unity. The same policy will be conducted towards Wang Ming … I ask you to rest assured. All your thoughts, all your feelings are close to my heart …
Mao then paid Wang Ming two long visits.
Dimitrov wrote on 25 February saying that he was particularly pleased by Mao’s second (groveling) telegram. This and subsequent missives had a we-can-work-together tone.
On 28 March, Mao asked Vladimirov to send a telegram to his son An-ying. It told him not to think about returning to China. Mao, it said, was “very happy about his successes in his studies.” Mao asked his son “not to worry about his [Mao’s] health. He feels well.” He asked An-ying to convey “warm greetings” to Manuilsky and Dimitrov, who, Mao said, “have assisted … the Chinese revolution. It is to them that Chinese comrades and their children owe their education in [Russia], their upbringing and maintenance.”
This was Mao saying to Moscow: I accept you keeping An-ying as a hostage. With this understanding, An-ying remained in Russia.
Dimitrov meanwhile told Wang Ming to compromise. While protesting that the rift was not his fault, a helpless Wang Ming promised to work with Mao, but asked Moscow to try to restrain him.
