| Mao | Ai Siqi |
| (a13) Sublation is: on the one hand, the rejection and negation of the negative element, and, on the other hand, the subjection of the positive element to criticism and transformation, as well as its preservation; but, it is not simple rejection. Ye Qing says: “In the past formal logic governed all spheres of research, at present, however, it is limited to states of relative rest”. This way, our negation of formal logic can only be of its scope of application and not its character. If this is not simple preservation – what is it? If this is not the essential acknowledgement that formal logic and dialectics are of equal significance – what is it? (Zhang Youren) | (b13) First, Ye Qing says again and again that he himself has not put formal logic and dialectical logic on an equal footing. He acknowledges that, “the latter assimilates the former, replaces the former”. He also says the latter sublates the former, negates it. However, what is his understanding of sublation and negation? He says sublation is not simple rejection and that negation is not simple negation. It would seem this point is correct because sublation, on the one hand, rejects the negative element and negates it, on the other hand, it must subject the positive element to criticism and transformation and preserves it. This obviously is not simple rejection. However, what we should take note of is that Ye Qing, in speaking this sentence does not indicate he has this proper understanding. He wants to lead us to the other extreme. He regards preservation in sublation as simple and uncritical preservation. He considers that the dialectical sublation of formal logic is merely the preservation of formal logic within narrowly drawn limits and not the critical assimilation of dialectics into its content. He says, “In the past formal logic governed all spheres of research, at present, however, it is confined to states of relative rest”. This way, our negation of formal logic can only be the negation of its scope of application and not the negation of its character. If this is not simple preservation – what is it? Is not this the essential acknowledgement that formal logic and dialectics are of equal significance? |
| (a14) At any point in space, things in motion, at the same time, are at rest and not at rest. This is the unity of contradiction. Ye Qing says: “Motion is the accumulation of rest, rest is the cessation of motion, they engender each other and are mutually supportive as well as mutually determining”. Rest is only a specific form of motion; it is certainly not the cessation of motion, and motion is certainly not the accumulation of rest; if it is only the accumulation of rest it would mean that motion is eliminated in rest. (Zhang Youren) | (b14) Secondly, although Ye Qing acknowledges in words that motion is absolute and that rest is relative, and it seems he has not so far put motion and rest on an equal footing, nevertheless, these are only words, in reality he has already put these two on an equal footing. He says, “Motion is the accumulation of rest, rest is the cessation of motion; they engender each other and are mutually supportive as well as mutually determining”. This, then, is Ye Qing’s understanding of the relation between motion and rest. Motion is merely the accumulation of rest! Motion in the world is able to cease. The two are mutually determining! According to what I know, rest is only a specific form of motion. It is certainly not the cessation of motion; and motion is certainly not the accumulation of rest. If it is simply a case of the accumulation of rest then it is basically “not able to become motion”, and it basically eliminates motion in rest. He says, “In its progress through time, motion must come to rest in space”. This makes it clear that he does not basically know how to use dialectics to comprehend motion. At any point in space, things in motion, at the same time, are at rest and not at rest. This is the unity of contradiction of motion. If there is not this unity of contradiction and there is simply only rest, no matter how it accumulates it cannot become motion. Here, Ye Qing clearly forgets to use the law of the unity of contradiction to understand motion. Here, can one make out what his true colours are? |
| (a15) Formal and dialectical logic are most fundamental questions. | (b15) A great many readers have sent in letters asking about the criticism of Zhexue jianghua (Talks on philosophy). This criticism came from various quarters and there were sundry opinions. Some were sympathetic and some were not; some were well-meaning and some were malicious. I thought that in addition I would write an article giving a general reply and at the same time take the opportunity to make a self-criticism, and regard this as the preface of the fourth edition of this book. Here, I only want to discuss Mr Zhang’s and Mr Qu’s request to explain the question of formal and dialectical logic. This, on the one hand, is because, just like Mr Zhang says, this question is a most fundamental one, on the other hand, it is because Ye Qing has used a special essay to dispute with me. Therefore, I am also using a special essay to reply to him. |
| (a16) Dialectical logic: A is A and at the same time it is not A; a thing is at the same time identical and not identical with itself. Formal logic only sees the aspect of identity. Dialectics, however, not only sees this aspect, it also sees the other aspect (not identical), therefore, it is able to embody, assimilate, and sublate formal logic. What formal logic cannot see, dialectics can see, what formal logic has seen, dialectics not only sees but transforms and deepens. | (b16) According to Ye Qing the dialectical formula is “besides A is A, at the same time it maintains A is not A”. We may make a simple point, and that is: A is A, and at the same time it is not A. This is contrary to the law of identity of formal logic. Its meaning is: “a thing is at the same time identical and not identical with itself”. |
| In these two formulae we can already see the relation between formal logic and dialectics. That is, at any one time, dialectics needs to see the identity and non-identity within a thing itself. Formal logic, however, only sees the aspect of “identity”. Dialectics does not just see this aspect, and consequently can embody, assimilate, and sublate formal logic. What formal logic cannot see, dialectics can see. What formal logic has seen, dialectics can not only see, but transforms and deepens. |
| (a17) One cannot say: “on the one hand, acknowledge A is A, and, on the other hand, acknowledge A is not A” and then consider this to be dialectics. The relation between these two propositions is not a case of on the one hand and on the other hand; but is one where at the same time they permeate each other and are bound together. They are a unified whole and are not mechanically combined; neither can they be mechanically broken up. If they are broken up and understood in this way, then the result is eclecticism. The dialectics of Ye Qing, then, is this eclectic distortion. | (b17) All that has been said above is apparently not any different to Ye Qing. It seems to be what he has said. But, let us look into this in a more concrete fashion and then we may find out how much, in fact, Ye Qing, who proclaims that other people “basically do not understand dialectics”, himself understands? |
| First, we need to pay attention to how dialectics “assimilates” formal logic. Dialectics, in order to assimilate formal logic needs to digest, transform, and dissolve it so it becomes its own flesh and blood. It does not simply invite it to enter its house and assign to it its own domain, then think that in doing this it has elevated it. People who distort dialectics mechanically break up “A is A, at the same time A is not A” into two propositions of formal logic. They hold that as long as, on the one hand, one acknowledges A is A, and, on the other hand, acknowledges A is not A, then it is considered dialectics. They do not know that the relation between these two propositions is not “on the one hand” and “on the other hand” but “at the same time”; it is their mutual permeation. The two propositions are a unified whole and not a mechanical combination. Therefore, one cannot mechanically break these up in this way. Thus, when they do break them up in this way the result is an eclectic understanding of dialectics. Superficially, they can confuse what is said of dialectics. They acknowledge that one needs to “take dialectics as a guide” in order to engage in theoretical thinking, but, in reality, their dialectics is only the eclectic combination of several propositions of formal logic. Superficially, it seems as though they are using dialectics to sublate formal logic, yet, in fact, they are eliminating dialectics in formal logic. |
| Dialectics’ sublation of formal logic, obviously, is not only rejection, for at the same time it assimilates the positive elements of formal logic. But, this assimilation is just like Mr Zhang says: it is not only preservation. Yet eclecticism draws us entirely to this extreme. It says formal logic still has a domain within dialectics; its scope is merely reduced somewhat. Looking at this as a whole, formal logic is still led and “controlled” by dialectics, but looking at it from a partial perspective, eclecticism still governs formal logic. The dialectics of Ye Qing, then, is an example of this eclectic distortion. |
| (a18) Ye Qing admits that the inductive and deductive methods are founded on formal logic, and need to be sublated by dialectics. However, he also says: “In their application we can treat the inductive method and the deductive method categorically, using them at the appropriate occasion in the dialectical process of research”. In this way it is acknowledged that the complete process of research is dialectical, but in this process there are times when one needs to use the inductive method and the deductive method. The combination of these methods, then, becomes the complete dialectical process of research. | (b18) For example, the inductive and deductive methods. Ye Qing admits that these two methods are founded on formal logic and need to be sublated by dialectics. He says, “dialectics controls the inductive and deductive methods”. However, how does this so-called control do this controlling? “In their application we can treat the inductive method and the deductive methods categorically, at the appropriate occasion in the dialectical process of research”. The meaning of this is that although the complete process of research is dialectical, at various occasions in this process, there are times when one needs to use the inductive method, and there are times when one needs to use the deductive method. The combination of these methods becomes the complete dialectical process of research. |
| (a19) The inductive method seeks out from amongst a great many complex, particular things their general, pure common points; the method it adopts is analysis. The deductive method uses general principles to explain particular things; the method it adopts is synthesis. The former proceeds from the particular to the general and from the concrete to the abstract; the latter proceeds from the general to the particular and from the abstract to the concrete. According to Ye Qing’s method, the whole of dialectics is merely the mechanical and eclectic combining of the inductive and deductive methods. | (b19) We know that the inductive method needs to seek out from amongst a great many complex, individual things, their general, pure common points; the method it adopts is analysis. The deductive method uses general principles to explain particular things; its method, contrary to the inductive method, is synthesis. The inductive method proceeds from the particular to the general and from the concrete to the abstract; the deductive method, on the contrary, proceeds from the general to the particular and from the abstract to the concrete. According to Ye Qing: our “use of dialectics in research then includes the inductive and deductive methods” and, in the complete dialectical process of research the inductive and deductive methods each has its appropriate place; in that case, the whole of dialectics is merely a question of here the inductive method, there the deductive method – this mechanical, eclectic combination. |
| (a20) Ye Qing’s formulation appears to be dialectical research, and proceeds from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular; it is the inductive and deductive method; in fact, this is wrong. | (b20) Perhaps Ye Qing may say he is using dialectics in studying things and that he proceeds from a great many concrete, individual things to the discovery of general laws, and that he again applies these general laws to individual concrete things. The former stage of the process being the appropriate place for induction and the latter stage of the process belonging to the deductive method. In fact, this is wrong. |
| (a21) Although, in dialectics, at the stage of from the particular to the general, ordinary inductive methods such as observation, comparison, and analysis are used, they are only used as key elements. Because the inductive method only uses the method of analysis here, it only grasps determinations that are simple and one-sided. Dialectics is not like this, not only is it analysis, at the same time it is synthesis. It not only grasps determinations that are simple and one-sided, but it needs to seek out determinations that are allsided and unities of contradiction. | (b21) Although, in dialectics, at the stage of the process from the individual to the general are used ordinary inductive methods such as observation, comparison, and analysis, they are only used as key elements. Not only must dialectics be employed at this stage of the ascent of the particular to the general, the dialectical method must be implemented and not here replaced with a totally unchanged inductive method. Here, the inductive method only uses the method of analysis. From complex, diverse things it only grasps determinations that are simple and one-sided. Here, however, dialectics not only analyzes, but at the same time, it uses synthesis. It not only grasps determinations that are simple and one-sided, but it seeks out determinations that are all-sided and unities of contradiction. According to Ye Qing, the research process of the general to the particular should be characterized as the appropriate place for the deductive method; if it only uses the method of synthesis, only applies general laws to individual things and synthesizes individual things, then this will do. In fact, one must implement dialectics here; dialectics not only uses laws here, and not only needs to synthesize, but at the same time, it still needs to analyze the specific conditions of these individual things and discover the tendencies of new particular contradictions. |
| In the process of the general to the particular, will it do to only use the deductive method, adopt the method of synthesis, apply general laws to, and synthesize, individual things? No! If dialectics is to be implemented, then, one does not only use laws and adopt synthesis, but in doing this, one still needs to analyze the concrete conditions of these individual things and discover the tendencies of new particular contradictions. | |
| (a22) No matter whether it is from the general to the particular or from the particular to the general, our methods are both basically dialectical. The inductive and deductive methods have only an application as respective elements of the process of research. They cannot be separated from each other and stand alone. They are not simply rejected, nor are they simply preserved, but are assimilated, digested, and transformed. Dialectics is the whole of dialectics and is not the piecing together of the inductive and deductive methods. | (b22) In this way, no matter whether it is from the particular to the general or from the general to the particular, our methods are both basically dialectical. The inductive and deductive methods have only an application as respective elements of the process of research. They cannot be separated from each other and stand alone. Although they are not simply rejected, neither are they simply preserved. They are assimilated, digested, and transformed. Because dialectics is itself the whole of dialectics, it is not the piecing together of the inductive and deductive methods. |
| (a23) The quality of things does not change in the process of quantitative change; at this time, in terms of quality, it is at relative rest, however, in terms of quantity, it is in motion throughout. Because relative rest is still a particular form of absolute motion one still needs to use dialectics in studying relative rest; only then will one be able to see things in a profound way. Formal logic can only see the aspect of rest, moreover, it can overstate this aspect and forget basic states of motion. Since dialectics can grasp the all-sidedness of things, and even the aspect of formal logic is contained in it, why does one still want to use formal logic in studying relative rest? | (b23) This distortion of dialectics by Ye Qing can also be seen in his interpretation of the relation between states of motion and states of rest. Although, verbally, he acknowledges the absolute nature of motion and the relative nature of rest, in reality, he has already put motion and rest on an equal footing: “they engender each other and are mutually supportive as well as mutually determining”. He completely misunderstands what the significance of absolute as well as relative is. As Mr Zhang says, rest is only a particular form of motion; things at rest are essentially still in motion. For example, the quality of things does not change in the process of quantitative change. At this time we can say, with regard to the aspect of quality, that it is at relative rest. However, with regard to the aspect of quantity, it is in motion throughout. On the surface, a stone does not move or change; internally, however, it continuously undergoes a process of quantitative change (although, this is very slow). The change of feudal society is often very sluggish, but you cannot say it has not changed. Because relative rest is basically a manifestation of the state of motion, we still need to use dialectics in our study of relative rest. Only then will one be able to see things in a very profound way. We are not saying that research using formal logic is completely without merit, but that formal logic can only see the aspect of rest, moreover, it can overstate this aspect and forget basic states of motion. Since, for us, dialectics can grasp the all-sided (the formal logic aspect is embodied in this) we do not still need to use formal logic to grasp it. Is not the way of Ye Qing, which considers that by relying only on formal logic relative rest can be completely grasped and which considers that the domain of formal logic will be permanently preserved, an extremely vulgar distortion? |
| (a24) Ye Qing says: “Understanding the basic character of the Chinese economy is obviously a study of a state of rest and consequently is a question undoubtedly established on the basis of formal logic”. | (b24) When he discusses the study of the economic character of China this eclectic distortion is even more evident. He considers that understanding the basic character of the Chinese economy is obviously a study of a state of rest, and consequently is a question undoubtedly raised on the basis of formal logic. In Ye Qing’s opinion it is only the study of the development of China’s society that is the study of a state of motion and a dialectical question. The study of “form, quality, and relation, etc.”, however, are studies of states of rest. This is such obvious eclecticism! In fact, quality and relation are the starting point of development. Without this starting point there is no development. Ye Qing himself says, “Economics needs to be understood before it is known at what stage of evolution Chinese society is, and what revolution is needed”. As to this starting point: although we cannot regard it as development itself, if we are faithful to dialectics, we at least need to see within it the original motive force of development, as well as a variety of specific contradictions. This, then, is not something formal logic can grasp. Naturally, if you definitely base yourself on formal logic and advance this question, of course, that suits you, but this way you only see one side or it becomes formalism. This is to say: you want to use the deductive method, so first you adopt a general formula, then, you look to see what the nature of the Chinese economy is, then, relying on this formula, you determine China’s needs. For example, feudal society needs a capitalist revolution, this is a general formula. The answer to your research tells you that China’s economy is a feudal one, thereupon, you say China needs a capitalist revolution and the establishment of a capitalist society. In formal logic this, naturally, is very coherent. But, do the specific conditions of Chinese society comply with this formula? Your deduction cannot manage this. However, Chinese society cannot comply with your deductive formula. Although Chinese society is feudal, its special conditions do not permit that it will undergo a Western European style capitalist revolution, nor do they permit the establishment of capitalist society. This can only be done through dialectical study, for none of this can be seen by the deductive method of formal logic. In understanding Chinese economics, people who are faithful to dialectics must implement it. They cannot assign a domain to it here, thus giving empty formalism room to establish itself. (Plekhanov, esteemed by Ye Qing, made the mistake of formalism precisely because of this kind of thing.) |
| This is wrong; this is eclecticism. According to his opinion, it is only the study of the development of China’s society that is the study of a state of motion and a dialectical question. Form, quality, and relation, etc., are only the study of states of rest and ought to belong to formal logic. Is not this obvious eclecticism? | |
| Quality and relation and such questions are the starting point of development; although it cannot be regarded as development itself, if we are faithful to dialectics, we should at least see in them the motive force of development, see in them specific contradictions; can formal logic do this? Formal logic only sees one side; it can only become formalism. For example, feudal society needs a capitalist revolution; this is a formula. Because China’s economy is feudal it is then said that China needs a capitalist revolution and the establishment of capitalist society. In formal logic, this kind of deduction is very coherent, and we can only say this, but China’s specific conditions are denied. The specific conditions of China do not permit that it will be restricted historically to a capitalist revolution, nor do they permit the establishment of capitalist society. All questions like this are questions that formal logic cannot solve, only dialectics can. The formalism of Plekhanov to Ye Qing cannot solve any question. | |
| (a25) Two thousand years ago Greek sophists regarded motion as innumerable points of rest in space, and therefore concluded that there are only innumerable points of rest and no motion. Ye Qing says rest is the cessation of motion and motion is the accumulation of rest; this is the return to life of sophism. | (b25) First, he says motion is the accumulation of rest, and rest is the cessation of motion. This is just like Mr Zhang says, not only does it eclectically combine rest and motion, but it does it to the extent that as a result it eliminates motion in rest. Two thousand years ago Greek sophists had already developed this theory. They regarded motion as the sum total of innumerable points of rest in space and consequently concluded that there are only innumerable points of rest and no motion. Who would have thought that sophism would return to life in the mouth of “twentieth century” Ye Qing. This truly makes people want to “acclaim it as the height of perfection”. |
| (a26) Lenin says, “a simple judgement is also a unity of contradiction. For instance, the proposition ’Ivan is a man’ has the meaning of ‘the particular is equal to the general’”. Formal logic often makes this kind of proposition, “a youth is a shop-assistant”, but not, “a youth is a youth”, and this is because formal logic itself cannot strictly abide by the law of identity without making itself untenable. When formal logic uses this kind of proposition it naturally has not considered that it contains a contradiction, and therefore it cannot be said that this is an application of the law of the unity of contradiction. However, we cannot deny that this kind of proposition in essence contains a unity of contradictions. | (b26) Secondly, in formal logic the proposition “the youth is a shop-assistant” is common, and this must be so for formal logic becomes untenable if strictly according to the law of identity one is only able to say “the youth is a youth”. When we say “the youth is a youth” contains a contradiction, it is to indicate that formal logic itself cannot strictly abide by the law of identity. When formal logicians use this proposition they naturally have not thought that it contains a contradiction, and therefore this proposition is certainly not an application of the law of the unity of contradiction. But we still cannot deny that this kind of proposition in essence contains a unity of contradictions. Ilyich, in his Philosophical Notebooks, says, “a simple judgement is also a unity of contradiction. For instance, the proposition ‘Ivan is a man’ has the meaning of ’the particular is equal to the general’”. It is not known whether Ye Qing understands this point or not. |
| (a27) Ai Siqi says: “Things that are different are not contradictions, for instance, a pen, ink, and chair are not contradictions. But if the principles of development and change are understood then it is known, that under certain conditions, things that are different are able to transform themselves into contradictions. If at the same time and place two definite things begin to act on each other in a mutually exclusive fashion, then they become contradictions. For instance, a shop-assistant and a writer are basically without contradiction, but if a certain shopassistant has an interest in writing and thinks of becoming a writer, the two then become mutually exclusive within an entity and form a contradiction. If it is thought only such things as good and bad, male and female are contradictions and other things cannot transform themselves into contradictions, then, it is a formalistic differentiation. Is this distinguishable from Zhang Dongsun’s formalistic division of “contrary, contradiction, and opposition”? The basic principle is correct but the formulation “difference is not contradiction” is not. One should say that, under certain conditions, all things that are different are contradictions. A person sits at a chair, dips a pen into ink to write an essay. Because a person and writing, these two definite conditions, temporarily unites the things that are in contradiction, one cannot say these differences are not contradictions. When a cook prepares food, he takes firewood, rice, oil, salt, sauce, vinegar, and vegetables and, under certain conditions, unites them. Under certain conditions, a shopassistant and a writer are also able to unite. Part work-part study can unite work and study. Difference is each and every thing, all being under certain conditions, conntradictions; therefore, difference itself is contradiction; this is what is called a concrete contradiction. Ai’s formulation is unsatisfactory (Mao Zedong’s opinion). | (b27) Thirdly, things that are different are certainly not contradictions, and so such things as a pen, ink, and a chair are not contradictions. However, if dialectics is truly “understood” and the principles of development and change are understood, then ii must be known that under certain conditions things that are different can alsj transform themselves intj contradictions if at the same time and place these two different things begin to act on each other in a mutually, exclusive fashion. For example, a shop assistant and writer are two different, totally unrelated things. However, if someone who is a shop-assistant is very interested in writing as well as dissatisfied with his or her existing state of affairs and thinks hard about becoming a writer, at that time two different things – a shopassistant and writer, within an entity, become mutually exclusive. Can you say this is not a contradiction? Can you say this shop-assistant has not experienced a contradiction in his or her life? If you insist that only good and bad, male and female, etc. can be considered contradictions and other things cannot transform themselves into contradictions, then what is the difference between this formalistic method of differentiation and Zhang Dongsun’s division of “contrary, contradiction, and opposition”, etc. Can this be the thinking of a person who “understands” dialectics? |
| (a28) The formula “A is B or not B” of the law of the excluded middle, in fact, contains a contradiction: that is, “A is not A but is B”, or “B can be B or not B”; Hegel has already criticised this. | (b28) Fourthly, in formal logic, “a youth is a shop assistant” suits only the formula A is A of the law of the excluded middle; everybody understands this. But the focus of our attention is to indicate: can a proposition of formal logic fundamentally find a role in dialectics and be “under the jurisdiction of moving logic”? We do not want to classify the law of the excluded middle with the law of the unity of contradiction. The formula “A is B or not B”, in fact, already contains a contradiction: that is, “A is not A but is B” or “B can be B or not B”; Hegel has already criticised this. But, perhaps for Ye Qing it is not easy to understand because from start to finish he only knows how to use a formal mind to carry out rigid classification, and he is unaware of development and change. |
| (a29) Although external cause may not be overlooked, it cannot determine necessity in things. What determines necessity is internal change. Ye Qing says, “one must acknowledge the interaction of internal and external cause”. This is mechanical interaction where the two sides are with out a relative superiority or inferiority. This, then, forms Ye Qing’s eclectism. Dialectical interaction is not like this. In it, the two sides are distinguished by a primary and secondary significance. | (b29) Although external cause may not be overlooked, it cannot determine necessity in things. What determines necessity in things is internal cause. At this point the two must be distinguished in terms of superiority and inferiority. Ye Qing says dialectics must acknowledge interaction. |
| Ye Qing’s question is admitted, “Mechanics need an external motive force: water encounters external heat and vaporizes; the evolution of organisms is due to the environment; are these not facts?” This is not a question of simple denial. However, at the same time the activity of the thing itself in [this process of] change must be acknowledged; this is the determining factor in [the process of] change in things. Mechanics has movability; water has the property of vaporization; it is the nature of organisms to evolve. Because of this, external causes such as motive force, heat, and the environment have a function. Internal cause determines the necessity of change in things, not external cause. | Therefore, there must be an interaction between internal and external cause. However, one knows that when speaking of interaction there is the difference between mechanical and dialectical interaction. Mechanical interaction is reciprocal. The two sides are without a relative superiority and inferiority. This kind of interaction can only form Ye Qing’s eclecticism. In dialectical interaction, however, the two sides are distinguished by a primary and secondary significance. In the interaction between internal and external cause dialectics stresses the primary determining function of internal cause. This is what is meant by saying “what is called the occurrence of internal action, then, is considered to be the reason for necessity in things”. Ye Qing has put several questions to me, “Mechanics needs an external motive force, is this not a fact; water encounters external heat and vaporizes, is this not a fact; the evolution of organisms is due to the environment, is this not a fact?” |
| I naturally reply “yes”. I cannot simply deny it. However, acknowledging these facts is not the same as acknowledging that external cause determines necessity. If you ask, “Motive force causes mechanical movement, is this necessity? Heat causes water to vaporize, is this necessity?” I naturally will answer in the affirmative. However, if you again ask, “Well then, is not the determination of this ‘necessity’ precisely motive force, heat, etc.?” To this I will reply in one word “no”. Why is the answer “no”? Because Ye Qing himself must acknowledge that, “External cause must depend on internal cause to become external cause. If mechanics lacks dynamism, motive force cannot become the motive force of mechanics. If water lacks the property of vaporization, heat then becomes the heat of water and it cannot vaporize”. |
