The interesting point about this statement of philosophical premises is that Mao posits the existence of a material reality prior to the existence of humankind, a position incapable of validation through the agency of human experience for the simple reason that no humans existed. It is also very clear that Mao regarded the materialist “premise” as one which had to be “acknowledged”, and although he does subsequently proceed to elaborate “proofs” for this premise, they are proofs ultimately grounded on the acceptance of the premise itself, namely, that a material reality exists independently of human consciousness.

Consequently, the epistemological picture which emerges from an evaluation of the philosophy contained in the three philosophical essays under question is one of a tension between a rationalist and an empiricist approach to epistemology.[1-94] On the one hand it is rationalist: the universe is a rational order; the relationships between objects in the universe constitute a rational structure; the universe and its constituent objects are ordered according to a series of objectively existing universal laws, these laws providing criteria of truth by which propositions about reality are to be evaluated; thought (as matter) is structured in a way which parallels external reality; phenomena possess “essences” not immediately apprehendable by sensory perceptions. Each of these rationalist dictums appears in these philosophical essays, and particularly so in Dialectical Materialism. On the other hand, however, it is empiricist: knowledge derives from experience; the first stage in the knowledge process is perceptual knowledge; perceptual knowledge is transformed into conceptual knowledge (how we are not told);[1-95] the criterion of truth for conceptual knowledge is practice; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is “under normal conditions” the principal aspect;[1-96]knowledge of reality is progressively deepened through a process of practice in which reality and the subject of cognition are transformed; and so on. Each of these empiricist propositions too can be located within these philosophical essays. How is this tension in Mao’s epistemology to be reconciled? Is it possible to reconcile it?

In the final analysis, there can be no reconciliation of the conflicting imperatives within Mao’s epistemology. One cannot at the same time elevate experience as the privileged site of knowledge production and defer to the primacy of thought in the rationalist mould (as Mao does in the pre-Liberation text of On Practice, for example)[1-97] without becoming entangled in a contradiction. The important point, it seems to me, is to recognise the significant rationalist element which exists in Mao’s philosophical position, and abandon the myth so prevalent in Western Mao studies that Mao was a crude empiricist and that the analysis of his thought and action should therefore employ an empiricism equally as crude.[1-98] For the existence of a rationalist element in Mao’s thought indicates that his actions were, contrary to empiricist expectations, driven by theory, often at a very abstract level.

The importance of a rationalist perspective to the activities of a Marxist revolutionary are obvious. In the first place, a concerted and protracted political struggle required more than the random and erratic insights which experience alone could provide. What was necessary was an elaborated theoretical framework which could allow questions to be asked about the nature of the historical process, which provided premises for an understanding of social structure, and which constructed criteria by which the effectivity of particular actions could be evaluated.[1-99] Secondly, a theoretical framework of the kind supplied by dialectical and historical materialism could provide motivation towards a future state of society hitherto unexperienced by humankind. No crude empiricist could talk, as Mao was wont to do during the Yan’an period, of an era of “perpetual peace” founded on communism as the inevitable future of humanity; for experience could not allow the possibility of such grand predictions.[1-100] It is very clear that the predictive element of Marxism was to exert a profound influence on Mao’s approach to revolutionary struggle, a predictive element which derived from a largely abstract conception of the potentialities of humankind and human society. It is consequently no coincidence that one of Mao’s favourite sayings is drawn from Lenin’s What is to be Done?, a saying which nicely illustrates the importance he attached to theory in directing revolutionary struggle; “without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement”.[1-101]

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