Similarly, the mechanistic theory of sham Marxism echoes the viewpoint of certain bourgeois right-wing[2-236] schools of thought within psychology; this in actuality has also completely overturned consciousness. They consider the processes of the physiology and comprehension of consciousness to be a particular characteristic of the nature of advanced material substance, and do not recognise that consciousness is a product of the social practice of humankind.[2-237] For the concrete historical identity of object and subject, they substitute the equality of object and subject, and the one-sided mechanistic objective world. These viewpoints which confuse consciousness with a physiological process are tantamount to the abolition of the fundamental question of philosophy of the relationship[2-238] between thought and existence, (p. 292) The idealism of the Mensheviks attempts to employ a compromise theory, one which reconciles materialism and idealism, as a substitute for Marxist epistemology. They oppose the principle of dialectics through the principles of[2-239] the “synthesis”[2-240] of objectivism and subjectivism and the “mutual assistance” of these two methods.[2-241] However, this principle of dialectics is both non-mechanistic objectivism and non-idealist subjectivism, and represents the concrete historical identity[2-242] of objective and subjective.
However, there is also the unusual theory of Plekhanov’s animist view on the problem of consciousness, which is fully expressed in his celebrated dictum “a stone also possesses consciousness”, [p. 214]. According to this viewpoint, consciousness does not occur in the process of development of matter, but exists in all matter from the very beginning; there is only a difference of degree between the consciousness of humans, low-level organisms, and a stone.[2-243]This anti-historical viewpoint is fundamentally opposed to the viewpoint of dialectical materialism which considers consciousness to be the ultimately occurring particular characteristic of matter.[2-244]
Only dialectical materialism’s theory of consciousness is the correct theory on problems of consciousness.
To be a thoroughgoing materialist, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge the material origins of consciousness; the knowability of matter by consciousness also must be acknowledged.
The question of whether or not matter can be known is a complex one; it is a question which all philosophers of the past have felt powerless[2-245] to deal with. Only dialectical materialism is able to provide the correct solution. On this question, the standpoint of dialectical materialism has been in opposition to agnosticism and is different to strident realism.
The agnosticism of Hume and Kant isolates the subject of knowledge from the object, and considers that it is not possible to transcend the limits which isolate the subject; between the “thing-in-itself” (p. 293) and its outward form exists an impassable chasm.
The strident realism of Machism equates the object with sense perceptions, and considers that the truth is already established in final form in sense perceptions. At the same time, Machism not only does not understand that sense perceptions are a result of the effects of the external world, it moreover does not understand the active role of the subject in the process of cognition, namely, [p. 215] the transformative work of the sense organs and thinking brain of the subject,[2-246] on the effects of the external world (such that two forms – impressions and concepts – are made manifest).
It is only the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism which has positively answered the problem of knowability to become the “soul” of Marxist epistemology. This theory has clearly demonstrated that our impressions and concepts not only arise from objective things, but also reflect them. It demonstrates that impressions and concepts are neither a product of the spontaneous development of the subject as the idealists suggest, nor the label given objective things as suggested by the agnostics; they are rather the reflection of objective things, a photographic image and sample copy of them.
Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject.[2-247] Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves final form gradually rather than instantaneously. The viewpoint of strident realism, which considers objective truth achieves final form in sense perceptions and that we gain it thus, is a mistaken one.