It is thus only in the realm of epistemology, and not ontology, that one could speak of a distinction between thought and matter, and much of Mao’s epistemology is concerned with the mechanism by which thought can have access to and come to know objectively the realm of reality. This dichotomy was made clear in an earlier article (1936) on military strategy; “everything outside of the mind (tounao) is objective reality”.[1-43]Moreover, in Dialectical Materialism, Mao refers to the “knowability” (kerenshixing) of matter by consciousness,[1-44] and proceeds to argue that the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism has positively resolved the problem of “knowability” and is thus the “soul” of Marxist epistemology.[1-45]The suggestion that human thought is a reflection of objective reality permeates Dialectical Materialism and a short section (Section 9 of Chapter 2) is devoted to it. The formulation of reflection theory contained there is fundamentally similar to the epistemology contained in On Practice. Schram has, on the basis of sections 1‒6 of Chapter 2, suggested a more profound epistemology to be found in On Practice than in Dialectical Materialism.
…the extraordinarily simplistic exposition of the “reflection” theory as the beginning and end of Marxist epistemology is a far cry from the sophisticated presentation of “On Practice”.[1-46]
This judgement cannot, I would suggest, be borne out by a close comparison of the two documents. While it is true that On Practice devotes a good deal more space (and perhaps intellectual effort) explicitly to the issue of epistemology, the notions of knowledge as a reflection of natural and social realities, and of deepening knowledge through a process of progressive engagement with reality (i.e., practice) are present in both sources. For example, in Dialectical Materialism, Mao argues that:
Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject. Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves final form gradually rather than instantaneously … in the process of cognition, the material world is increasingly reflected in our knowledge more closely, more precisely, more multifariously, and more profoundly.[1-47]
A good deal of On Practice is actually devoted to fleshing out the concept adumbrated in the quote above that, while knowledge is a reflection of objective reality, it only comes to reflect it accurately through a process of practice which may involve a considerable length of time and expenditure of energy as the subject of cognition grapples with reality and attempts to alter it. The suggestion that in either text Mao’s epistemology is premised on a simple assumption of a mirror reflection in which thought exactly or immediately mirrors reality is quite wrong. The overly passive epistemology of a simple reflection theory is absent from both texts. Moreover, the notion of a complex reflection as spelt out in Dialectical Materialism logically precedes the elaboration of epistemology contained in On Practice, and it also precedes it textually. If the three essays on philosophy are indeed part of “a single intellectual enterprise”, we would expect nothing less.
It is also important to note that the epistemological judgements rendered in Dialectical Materialism and On Practice draw heavily on arguments already existing within Marxist philosophy and in particular those elaborated by Lenin and Engels. Lenin, in particular, had devoted a rather polemical book-length study to the issue of epistemology,[1-48] and as one would expect given the genealogy of Soviet Marxist philosophy discussed above, Lenin was in turn to draw heavily on the epistemological writings of Engels.[1-49] In drawing on Engels, Lenin articulates the conceptions of both reflection and practice as premises for the dialectical materialist approach to epistemology:
