Putin's Wars полностью

The figures for 1991 for the other republics are: Armenia 17.1 percent, Belarus 16.3 percent, Kazakhstan 23.1 percent, Turkmenistan 21.7 percent, and Ukraine 5.9 percent (Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR, 14–15). This dependence on the Union Budget could be one of the factors that explain the Central Asian republics’ initial, sometimes almost reluctant, attitude to “accepting” their independence in 1991.

10.

The Russian situation resembled, therefore, that of the British in India, of which A. N. Wilson wrote: “[T]he British incursion into India, which had begun as a profit-making enterprise for merchants, had become a drain on British resources.” (A. N. Wilson, After the Victorians: The Decline of Britain in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 489.)

11.

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Volume II, with an introduction by Prof. Edwin R. A. Seligman (London: Dent Dutton, 1971), 112–113.

12.

In 1881, for instance, the Earl of Dunraven wrote: “The future of England certainly depends upon her relationship with her colonies. She may remain the centre of a great empire, or become a small, scantily populated, and unimportant kingdom.” A prospect that was considered totally unacceptable by the author: “British possessions will remain British as long as we can hold them, by force if necessary.” (The Earl of Dunraven, “The Revolutionary Party,” August 1881, in Michael Goodwin, Nineteenth Century Opinion, 272–273.)

13.

Franz Cede, “The Post-Imperial Blues,” The American Interest, 7, no. 2 (2011), 118.

14.

Despite these doomsday prophecies the Netherlands experienced a protracted economic boom after the loss of Indonesia. This certainly helped to assuage post-imperial pain, but did not eradicate it. According to Thomas Beaufils, “In the Netherlands the workings of memory still prove difficult . . . . Fifty years [!] is a too short period to hope that wounds that are still open can be healed.” (Thomas Beaufils, “Le colonialisme aux Indes néerlandaises,” in Le livre noir du colonialisme: XVIe–XXIe siècle: de l’extermination à la repentance, ed. Marc Ferro (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2003), 262.)

15.

Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, xiv. The same image was used by the Russian sociologist Yury Levada, who said: “The phantom pain from the loss of the Soviet empire remains vivid, like an amputated limb that one still feels.” (Quoted in Marie Jégo, Alexandre Billette, Natalie Nougayrède, Sophie Shibab, and Piotr Smolar, “Autopsie d’un conflit,” Le Monde (August 31–September 1, 2008).)

16.

Van Doorn, Indische lessen, 72.

17.

Van Doorn, Indische lessen, 72.

18.

Van Doorn, Indische lessen, 73.

19.

Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, xvi.

20.

Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, xvi.

21.

Pitirim A. Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity: The Effects of War, Revolution, Famine, Pestilence upon Human Mind, Behavior, Social Organization and Cultural Life (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1946), 277. Sorokin was not the first to analyze the different phases of revolutions, nor their immanent tendency toward restoration of prerevolutionary trends. In his classic book, The Anatomy of Revolution (1938), Crane Brinton made a similar analysis. Sorokin, whose book was published four years later (the first printing was in 1942), did not quote Brinton.

22.

Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 277.

23.

Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 277.

24.

Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 280.

25.

Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 284.

26.

Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity, 283.

27.

Lilia Shevtsova, Russia: Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 320.

28.

F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 103.

29.