In fact all three arguments were severely biased. In the first place the Eurasian
Union is not a European Union bis. This is not only because its institutions lack real supranational authority, but
also because of the fundamental disequilibrium in particular that exists between its
constituent parts. The EU is a union of four big states, two medium-sized states,
and a group of smaller states in which none of the member states would be able to
establish a unilateral hegemony over the others. Even Germany, the EU’s economic powerhouse,
is in no position to dominate the rest. It has to recognize the superior military
and diplomatic power of both Britain and France. In the Eurasian Union, on the contrary,
the disequilibrium between the member states is striking. Not one of its prospective
member states can match the economic and military power of Russia. Even if the whole
CIS were to join, Russia’s weight would still dwarf the collective weight of the other
member states. In addition, there is still another problem. Russia is the former imperial
center with a centuries-long history of imperial conquest, which was characterized
by the suppression of the national identity and autonomy of the dominated peoples.
For this reason, wrote Umland, the “intellectual elites of the other post-Soviet republics
have more or less ambivalent stances, and, sometimes, negative views on their nations
past relations with Moscow.”[18] These reservations also concern Putin’s past. Putin, as a former KGB colonel, is
“a representative of those organs previously responsible for the execution of, among
other crimes, anti-national policies.”[19] One could, of course, point to Germany, which from being a European outcast became
a respected member of the EU. However this comparison would not be valid for two reasons.
The integration process in Western Europe was set up after World War II to heal the
scars the war caused. Germany started a painful process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with its past), which led to repentance, official apologies, and
compensation payments (Wiedergutmachung). In the case of Russia there are few signs that it feels responsible for the crimes
committed or the repressive policies in the former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc (excuses
for the Katyn massacre are a rare exception). The European Community, in addition,
was not only meant to heal. This originally French project was also meant to bind Germany to prevent history from repeating itself. Putin’s initiative for the Eurasian
Union, on the contrary, comes from the former imperial center. It neither heals the
crimes of the Soviet past, nor does it bind the former imperial power. On the contrary,
it represents a thinly disguised attempt to restore the lost empire on new foundations.[20]
The second argument, used by Putin in his Izvestia article to justify the Eurasian Union, was that the new Union would be built on shared
values. He mentioned as such democracy, freedom, and the principles of the market
economy. The reader will probably rub his or her eyes: whatever positive things one
may say about Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan, one can certainly not say that these
three countries are shining examples of freedom and democracy. All three have “lifelong”
leaders kept in place by organizing fake elections. All three have repressive regimes
that suppress opposition voices and violate fundamental human rights. All three also
lack an important condition of a functioning market economy: impartial courts.
The most amazing argument, however, is Putin’s third argument: a choice to join the
Eurasian Union does not exclude integration with the EU, but, on the contrary, “will
leave each of its members in much stronger positions to integrate more quickly into
Europe.” Putin is playing here a game of words with the concept “Europe.” As members
of the Eurasian Union these countries do not integrate into the EU, but in “Greater
Europe,” a name he gives to the Eurasian Union and the EU together. In fact Putin is referring here to trade negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian
Union and the eventual benefits for the member states of the Eurasian Union if they
negotiate with the EU as a bloc. However, this has nothing to do with integration into “Europe” or the EU. It is
a formulation intended to conceal that membership of the Eurasian Union implies an unequivocal geopolitical choice
that excludes membership of the EU.[21]
The Ultimate Goal: The Creation of a “Big Country”
