“Surkov and Prokhorov Spin Election,” Moscow Times (December 7, 2011).
44.
Julia Smirnova,“Wie Russlands patriotische Kosaken Moskau erobern,” Die Welt (November 28, 2012).
45.
“Medvedev Invites Opposition to Speak,” RIA Novosti (March 27, 2013).
46.
Cf. Aleksandra Samarina and Ivan Rodin, “Partiyno-politicheskiy modern,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (April 7, 2010).
47.
Emilio Gentile, Qu’est-ce que le fascisme? Histoire et interprétation (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 41.
48.
Renzo De Felice, Brève histoire du fascisme (Paris: Éditions Audibert, 2002), 46.
49.
De Felice, Brève histoire du fascisme, 46.
50.
Possibly different clans are behind the launch of different pro-Kremlin parties. According
to Philip P. Pan, Dmitry Medvedev was behind the launch of Pravoe Delo (The Right Cause), on February 18, 2009. The core of this new party was formed by
a former liberal opposition party, the Union of Right Forces, which had been convinced
by Vladislav Surkov to transform itself in a pro-Kremlin party. Leonid Gozman, one
of the leaders of The Right Cause, “said he considered the effort an attempt by Medvedev
to build a base of support.” But he immediately added that “he saw no serious differences
between Medvedev’s and Putin’s policies.” (Philip P. Pan, “Stepping Out From Putin’s
Shadow,” The Washington Post (February 9, 2009).)
51.
Roy Medvedev seemed to anticipate this scenario in a biography of Dmitry Medvedev.
“[T]he power question in Russia has been resolved,” he wrote, “and not only for the
next four years. One can say with certainty that this question has also been resolved
for the next twelve [years], and, maybe, even more.” (Cf. Roy Medvedev, Dmitry Medvedev: Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: Vremya, 2008), 5.) That President Dmitry Medvedev was ready to play a subservient
role in his relationship with his future prime minister was evident in the words he
spoke before being elected: “As the President said, I will work with the government,
according to its wishes, like clockwork. I am a man . . . who worked with the President
for 17 years” (ibid.). Medvedev was exactly the kind of president Prime Minister Putin
needed.
52.
This scenario was predicted by Mikhail Kasyanov, who served as Putin’s prime minister
for almost four years until 2004, but has since fallen out with the leadership and
now heads an opposition party. “I am convinced,” said Kasyanov in 2009, “that Putin
will run in 2012 for two six-year terms.” “Putin’s bid,” he added, “[is] to become
the longest-serving Kremlin leader since Stalin.” (Conor Humphries, “Russian Ex-PM
Says Putin Will Rule to 2024,” Reuters (September 25, 2009).)
Chapter 7
Preaching the Ultranationalist Gospel
The Transformation of “United Russia”
The Putinist “dynamic of change” expressed itself not only in the manipulation of
the “pluralist” party system by the presidential administration. It was also at work
inside the parties. This dynamic was characterized by the emergence of an ultranationalist
and chauvinist ideology in the ruling party United Russia, as well as in the tolerated
“opposition” parties. This development was especially unexpected in the case of the
CPRF, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which considered itself as the
successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[1]
The Ultranationalism and Revisionism of the Communist Party
