Europe’s ‘Year of Revolutions’, 1848, hardly touched the Empire. Not even Poland saw an insurrection. An attempt two years earlier had been scotched by the authorities simply by turning the serfs (many of them Ukrainian) against their hated Polish landlords. Nationalist ardour had remained cool ever since. But other powers were promoting it elsewhere. Partly in response to liberal opinion, partly to enlarge their markets, France and America as well as Britain were, albeit unofficially, encouraging national risings in the name of democracy. This tendency strengthened the anti-revolutionary stance not only of Russia, but of Prussia and Austria too. Together they had agreed, by the Convention of Berlin of 1833, to go to each other’s aid if threatened by external or internal enemies. In 1849, in accordance with the convention and at the request of the Emperor of Austria, Russian troops marched west to help suppress insurgent Hungary. Their actions prompted cries of protest from French and British liberals, though no action by their governments. Nevertheless, relations grew increasingly strained.
It was not only Russia’s southward advance at the expense of Turkey and Persia that gave rise to Western concern: its progress in central Asia and the Far East was also worrying. By 1847 a Russian base had been established on the Aral Sea, and army units were soon probing the frontiers of China beyond. Russia’s trading connection with China had recently become more important than ever. The Opium Wars had cut off Britain’s East India Company’s supply of tea, and Russia was well placed to fill the gap in the market, its supplies coming by caravan through Kyakhta.
In 1851 a new Cossack Host, which included some Buriat and Tungus tribesmen as well as Russian peasants, was to be set up on the far side of Lake Baikal, demonstrating that Russia intended to extend its presence along the Chinese frontier, and two years later an expedition was sent nearly 500 miles up the river Syr-Darya, towards Tashkent. Other imperialist methods were manifested further east. As early as 1836 there were already over 30,000 colonists on Russian territory in North America; 40 in 1853 the island of Sakhalin was taken over by the Russia—America Company, 41 and a Russian squadron visited Japan. Russia’s continuing advance on almost all fronts at last brought confrontation.
When it came, the prime target was the Russian port
Money had been lavished to make Sevastapol a fitting base for the southern fleet, observed another traveller, Laurence Oliphant, but he noticed a weakness: many of the 1,200 guns which guarded the approaches to the harbour had been poorly sited. He stressed another disadvantage for the Russians too: ‘Notwithstanding the large numerical force which occupies the south of Russia, the greatest difficulty must attend the concentration of the army upon any one point, until railroads intersect the empire, and its water communication is improved.’ 43 It remained to be seen if his prognostication would be borne out.
The occasion for war arose in 1853, when Russia insisted that Turkey revoke the right it had recently granted to the Catholic Church to protect the holy places in Jerusalem, and also recognize Russia as protector of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks, with French backing, rejected the demand, whereupon Russian troops marched south into the Romanian principalities. In response, British and French fleets sailed for the Black Sea in readiness for combat; the Turks declared war on Russia, and fighting began. The Russian Black Sea fleet destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope, but then the Western powers joined in — and on several fronts.