Russia полностью

What was the source of the disaster? Was it the inevitable consequence of an inevitable transition? Was it due to Communism and the bad habits it encouraged; or, as many Russians believed, the work of the United States? Washington certainly wished former Communist states to join the free-trade system and, as Bismarck had noticed a century and a half earlier, free trade favours robust economies, not vulnerable ones like Russia’s. Could it have been the fault of Russia’s own corrupt elite, the so-called nomenklatura, many of whom had also occupied important positions under Communism? Or were misconceived policies of the new men led by Boris Yeltsin and their advisers to blame?

The decline had begun under Gorbachev but little had been done to stop it. Inflation continued to spiral upward, reaching an annual rate of over 2,000 per cent before it eventually abated. The social impact of this factor alone was immense. Savings were wiped out; investment ceased. The International Monetary Fund advanced loans with conditions attached and some of the richer countries pitched in, notably Germany, which advanced Russia the equivalent of over $24 billion between 1989 and 1993, ¹ but most of these loans fell into the wrong hands and eventually disappeared into numbered Swiss bank accounts and American stocks. ² All that accumulated for Russians in Russia was foreign debt, which had hardly existed in the Soviet era. On the other hand Russia was no longer burdened by empire. It had shrunk almost to the frontiers of 1700 in Asia and of 1600 in Europe, and its population was now no more than 150 million. This was a manageable size for an economy, and Boris Yeltsin now proceeded to dismantle and rebuild according to a new model.

Yeltsin’s understanding of economics was limited, but he followed the advice urged upon him by the West and set young Russian economists to the task. American free-market theory provided the framework, and shock therapy was favoured over gradualism. The ideas of the Harvard economist Jeremy Sachs, which had recently accomplished an apparent miracle in Poland, were particularly influential, and the revolution was implemented in a hurry. It seemed that this would make the transition painful but short, but according to Anatolii Chubais, one of those chiefly responsible for the manner in which the transformation was undertaken, there was another, political, motive. Yeltsin was anxious to destroy the base for any Communist revival in the future. ³ So was Washington. Together they succeeded.

On 2 January 1992, the day after Russia began its separate existence, most prices were freed from state controls — though those for oil and other natural resources were kept so low that vast quantities were sold on abroad for profit. To make the new, higher, prices in the shops more affordable wages were raised, which meant further increases in the money supply. So did the huge subsidies doled out to public utilities. Together they led to a further spurt in inflation. This was eventually curbed by high interest rates, but investment dried up as a result. Furthermore, it suddenly became apparent that the lack of adequate financial institutions was a serious impediment. As the chief IMF economist remarked, the government had ‘tried to take a short cut to capitalism, creating a market economy without the underlying institutions, and institutions without the underlying institutional infrastructures’. ⁴

Capitalism cannot work its miracles without capital, and with foreigners reluctant to invest and newly rich Russians spiriting their assets away to foreign banks, no miracle was possible. Before long about $2 billion was leaving the country each month — more than all the aid, loans, credit and investment that were coming in. ⁵ So far things had gone very badly wrong. It seemed that the only way to create the elusive economic miracle was to stimulate appetites and let greed off the leash.