Russia полностью

In the event, political disarray in Poland allowed the Cossacks to sweep on as far as Lvov. It was to be 1651 before, deserted by the Tatars, they were beaten on the rain-drenched field of Berestechko. The struggle, however, continued, hostilities being punctuated from time to time by negotiations over a possible settlement. Meanwhile Khmelnytsky’s offer to the Tsar remained open, and in 1653, perhaps fearing that the opportunity might disappear if he procrastinated too long, the cautious Tsar at last committed himself to war with Poland — though not before taking careful soundings on an individual basis of an Assembly of the Land. This time, Russia’s treaty of ‘eternal peace’ with Poland was not regarded as an impediment. The Cossacks, it was argued, had already shaken off Polish rule and were an independent people. Besides, the Poles had committed such grave offences against Orthodox Christians in Ukraine as to cry out for retaliation. The following January the question of allegiance was put to a Cossack assembly (Rada) at Pereiaslav.

The summoning drums had sounded for an hour before Khmelnytsky appeared, and when the crowd fell silent he put the question. In essence, the Cossacks needed a protector. They could opt for the Sultan (who had already made overtures to them), the Khan of the Crimea, the King of Poland (who was willing to accept them back under his wing) or the Tsar of Russia. Whom did they choose? The cry went up for the Tsar. Khmelnytsky then led Cossack commanders into the church, where each in turn swore oaths of loyalty to the Tsar, and the Tsar’s representative formally invested Khmelnytsky with a banner, mace, cloak and cap — his new insignia as hetman, or commander.

Some Ukrainian historians have tried to argue that a treaty was negotiated at Pereiaslav; that acceptance of Russian rule was conditional on the Tsar’s honouring the terms; and that the Cossacks would be legally entitled to switch their allegiance if the Tsar reneged on any of his promises. But this misrepresents the evidence. The oaths that Khmelnytsky and the other Cossacks took were unconditional promises of allegiance. Colonel Bogun, the only notable who refused to swear, evidently understood this. Furthermore, even though the Cossack leadership had probably received intimations of what the Tsar was prepared to offer, the formal negotiations that defined what Cossack privileges were to be did not take place before the ceremony at Pereiaslav, but two months after.

The terms set out in the charter of privileges the Tsar then issued to his new subjects were better than could be got from Poland: an increase in the register of registered Cossacks (who were paid from state funds) from 40,000 to 60,000, confirmation of their previous privileges, freedom for the Orthodox Church, and the exclusion of Jews. ²⁶ As expected, Poland contested the Cossacks’ new allegiance and thereafter exploited differences within the ranks of the Cossack elite to promote rebellion. Securing Ukraine for Russia was to prove a long and costly business.

Though operations had to cover a wide front, the main thrust of Russia’s efforts in the campaign of 1654 was against Smolensk. The Cossacks represented their war as a crusade; the Tsar referred to it as a ‘blessed affair’ whose purpose was ‘to protect the true, Orthodox Christian faith’, and the army reflected this religious purpose. Priests and holy icons accompanied the troops, and many of the military colours they carried were sewn or painted with coloured crosses, representations of Jesus, of cherubim with flaming swords, of the Archangel Michael and of St George. Furthermore, the soldiers were ordered to go into battle reciting the Jesus prayer. ²⁷ That most of the foreign officers who marched with them were Catholics or Protestants rather than Orthodox Christians was of little concern, although a district of Moscow had recently been allotted for their exclusive use so that they could enjoy their own religious services without contaminating the civilian population.