This social and economic crisis formed the background to rising tensions between President Yeltsin and the parliament, which only intensified once Yeltsin’s extraordinary powers expired in December 1992. Parliamentary and presidential sides negotiated but failed to reach an agreement, especially on the difficult issues facing a country in post-communist transition. In April 1993 Yeltsin arranged a national referendum on his draft constitution, but won by a bare majority. That heralded an open confrontation between Yeltsin and the parliament, impelling each to manoeuvre and seek popular support. By the autumn of 1993, in the face of impending economic collapse and mass discontent, a desperate Yeltsin resorted to raw force and illegal, non-constitutional means: on 21 September 1993 he disbanded the parliament and announced plans for elections and a referendum on a new draft constitution. The parliament actively resisted Yeltsin’s
The balloting in December 1993 did nothing to resolve the political crisis. In the referendum, a majority of voters approved the Yeltsin constitution, but by a slim majority; given the low rate of voter participation, less than a third of the electorate approved the new constitution—and even these did so before Yeltsin released the actual text of this foundational document. Nor did the parliamentary elections (to what was now called the ‘State Duma’) give Yeltsin a reliable legislature; on the contrary, the opposition had a clear majority (with the Communist Party the largest contingent) determined to combat Yeltsin every step of the way. For the next six years Yeltsin had to govern without parliamentary support, and that only reinforced his predisposition toward personal rule and gravely complicated the government’s capacity to identify and resolve critical problems.
The Yeltsin Presidency
Boris Yeltsin reigned but did not rule. Although he claimed broad authority and built a personal (‘presidential’) administration to exert his will, Yeltsin actually had limited power. At the central level an oppositionist Duma fiercely contested his policies and sabotaged his legislative agenda. The new Duma elections in December 1995 did not help: the result was a two-thirds anti-Yeltsin majority (with the Communist Party ascendant), which was still more obstreperous, feeling empowered by the vote, Yeltsin’s low approval ratings, and keen awareness of the country’s desperate economic situation. But the Duma had only negative power: it could obstruct, but not impose its own will or chart a new direction. The Yeltsin constitution of 1993 sought to create a ‘super-presidency’ and therefore limited the parliament’s power to initiate legislation, check the executive branch, and impeach Yeltsin and his officials. The Duma did have the power to reject the president’s nominee for prime minister, but could do so only at its own peril: after three negative votes, the president could dissolve the Duma and call for new elections. That would force Duma deputies to risk losing their privileges and perquisites, a gamble that few deputies were willing to take. Once approved, the prime minister and his administration were not accountable to parliament. Nor did the Duma, given the reports of corruption and scandalous behaviour (fisticuffs and brawls during its august sessions), enhance its stature in public opinion. Still, as Yeltsin’s popularity plummeted and the domestic economic crisis deepened, the Duma had ample opportunity to trumpet the regime’s incompetence and corruption. The Duma dramatically demonstrated its
