Russia. A History полностью

With Yeltsin’s second and final term due to expire in July 2000, the Kremlin came to view Putin as a viable successor. Why Putin was chosen has been the subject of much speculation. The athletic 48-year-old Putin was certainly a striking contrast to the doddering, besotted, 69-year-old Yeltsin. Putin was articulate and well educated; he first received a degree in law, later earned a ‘candidate’ degree (Ph.D.) in economics, and had strong ties to influential liberal economists. His résumé glistened with experience: the service in Germany, Petersburg, and Moscow provided valuable preparation in critical areas of foreign and domestic policy. Putin also came across as a man of the people, willing—whether as cool calculation or a flash of temper—to use shocking vulgarities to make his point and an impression. He also acted like a president even before he became one: he wielded unprecedented authority as prime minister, playing a far more important and independent role in policy-making than had any of his predecessors. As Yeltsin looked for a successor, Putin’s meteoric rise in popularity—from a Yeltsinesque 2 per cent approval rating in August 1999 to 50 per cent four months later—gave every reason to believe that Putin could prevail even in a hotly contested presidential election. Some of Yeltsin’s critics adduce an additional reason for choosing Putin: kompromat (compromising materials), including allegations that his government, not terrorists, perpetrated the bombings used to justify the invasion of Chechnya. This kompromat, they argue, guaranteed that as president Putin would not dare to turn against Yeltsin and the ‘Family’.

While such accusations do not seem credible, they do highlight an important reason for Putin’s skyrocketing popularity: the Chechen conflict enabled Putin to demonstrate his mettle in an all-out military campaign to establish Russian control over Chechnya and eradicate terrorism. Contemporary polls showed that the ‘second’ Chechen war elicited public support both for the campaign and the prime minister, whose decisive leadership promised a clear military victory. And the military campaign appeared to succeed: within months, after relentless artillery bombardment, Russian forces stormed the Chechen capital of Groznyi—from which they had been so ignominiously expelled earlier—and launched search-and-destroy operations against pockets of guerrilla resistance. Although Chechnya hardly became a model of tranquillity, Putin demonstrated a willingness to use massive force, on a far greater scale than in the first Chechen war, and these early victories propelled his approval rating ever higher.

All this provided a favourable background for the new Duma elections of 19 December 1999. This time the Kremlin was determined to ensure the election of a supportive Duma—in contrast to the hostile majorities that prevailed in the 1993 and 1995 elections. Within a month of Putin’s appointment as prime minister, pro-Kremlin figures established a new party, ‘Unity’ (Edinstvo), to represent the regime in the election; it offered no specific programme other than to proclaim a commitment to the country’s ‘territorial integrity and national greatness’. Bankrolled by the oligarchs, bathed in favourable media coverage, and endorsed by a growing number of weathervane governors, the new party catapulted from nothing to win almost as many votes as the long-established Communist Party. Together with allied parties and independents, Unity headed a pro-government majority in the Duma and, given Putin’s popularity (even among Communists), ensured a cooperative Duma—quite unlike what Yeltsin had had to endure.

In the flush of that electoral victory, Yeltsin used his new year’s address on 31 December 1999 to drop a bombshell: he announced his resignation, effective immediately, with Prime Minister Putin (as the constitution stipulated) ascending to the office of acting president. Although Yeltsin rhetorically spoke of inaugurating a new millennium with a new president, the main purpose was to hasten the elections, which by law had to be held within three months of his resignation. Seeking to capitalize on Putin’s popularity, perhaps fearful that it might fade by summer (especially if the country became mired in a protracted Chechen war), Yeltsin resigned early in order to ensure Putin’s election. Putin immediately rewarded the former president: his first act was to guarantee immunity to Yeltsin and his immediate family from prosecution—a step widely regarded as a payback (if not precondition) for his early promotion.