In truth, both sides had apocalyptic expectations. Taken together with the industrial Five Year Plans, collectivization was the great and decisive struggle to create socialism. Lev Kopelev, a young activist at the time, confessed many years later:
Stalin had said ‘The struggle for grain is the struggle for socialism’. I was convinced we were warriors on an invisible front, waging war on kulak sabotage for the sake of grain needed for the Five Year Plan . . . [and] also for the souls of peasants whose attitudes were bogged down in ignorance and low political consciousness.
The destruction of the traditional village caused a major famine and poisoned the whole of social and economic life. The effects were especially devastating in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine was a major grain-growing region: the campaign was conducted ruthlessly there, and became enmeshed with the suspicion that Ukrainians might favour treacherously leaving the USSR and joining Poland. Hence the ‘
By the mid-1930s, many ‘kulaks’ managed to escape from their ‘special settlements’ and find jobs in the towns. Their appearance prompted a second spasm of terrorist activism by the state. In July 1937, Order No 00447 listed categories of ‘socially harmful elements’ to be arrested and, after a summary trial, either shot or sent to the Gulag. They included kulaks, priests, religious believers, old regime officials, and former members of non-Communist movements. The numbers to be arrested in each region were stipulated in advance; in practice, they were often exceeded as local NKVD agents ‘worked towards’ Stalin. In 1937–8, more than 760,000 people were arrested and 387,000 shot. Those who were not killed spent years, sometimes decades, in labour camps where exhausting work, poor nutrition, and inadequate medical care imposed their own death rates.
The manic distrust devastated party cadres too. Given his experience and mentality, Stalin could only interpret difficulties as a sign that enemies had infiltrated the highest levels of the party–state apparatus. The very intensity of the struggle had bred its own enmities, even – or perhaps especially – within such a tightly knit band of leaders. The struggle of black versus white left no room for shades of grey. After Lenin’s death in 1924, each party faction struck a pose of absolute doctrinal rectitude and total moral authority. That meant that disputes over the best strategy tended to polarize opinion, transforming intense trust into intense distrust. Opponents and even waverers had to be treated as deadly enemies, to be attacked and destroyed. When the Central Committee worked out a particular strategy, it had to be adopted unanimously. Those who had reservations about it were accused of being ‘deviationists’, then of being ‘oppositionists’, which implied open hostility. Under such suspicion, Trotsky, Stalin’s principal rival, was expelled from the USSR in 1929. In the 1930s, as the fear of war with Germany grew and social turmoil intensified, the rhetoric escalated further: ‘oppositionists’ became people with ‘terrorist intentions’, then full-scale ‘terrorists’ or ‘enemies of the people’, to be eliminated.
The
Cultural and social policy
