A voice on the auditorium’s loudspeaker immediately chimed in: “Major Hallerton, with an Event One situation briefing.” Hallerton was the shift’s ADI, or Assistant Chief of Intelligence. “Approximately fifteen minutes ago, Space Command was alerted by a FOREST GREEN nuclear- detonation-waming sensor on three different NAVSTAR satellites. The event remained unclassified by NORAD and DIA for several minutes until verification could be made by DSP resources, and they have not made a conclusive evaluation yet. However, by authority of CINCSPACECOM, an Event One warning was issued to us and to JCS and Zero- Tango conference initiated. SPACECOM is currently reporting a high probability of a small-yield nuclear explosion in the South China Seas region near the Philippines.”
Tyler felt his jaw drop. “Ho-ly
“Yes, sir,” Hallerton replied. “No other large-scale weapon detonations detected might suggest counterattacks. However, SPACECOM advises that the three NAVSTAR satellites have gone off the air and no other DSP or AMWS resources are on station to confirm any reports.”
“Estimate on yield?”
“No official reading yet, sir.”
“Well, anyone got an
“Sir, the only other indications we have are that COBRA DANE or BMEWS have not detected missile tracks from land- or submarine-launched missiles,” Hallerton said uneasily. The long-range over-the-horizon radars would have picked up the tracks of international missiles long ago. “All other stations are quiet, and intelligence reports no buildup of strategic forces or mobilization. This incident cannot be part of any massive attack against the CONUS.”
Tyler couldn’t believe it. A real nuclear detonation. But not a prelude to general war — or was it?
“When was the Pentagon notified and what did they say?” “NCA was notified five minutes ago by Space Command, sir,” Hallerton replied. “They requested follow-up notification from Teal Ruby satellite data on incoming missile tracks and received a negative reply. They are assembling the commands for a teleconference.”
Tyler looked surprised. “That’s it? A teleconference?” He turned to Stanczek. “What’s
“The notification message from Space Command didn’t direct any particular posture or DEFCON,” Stanczek said. “There’s a breakdown in communications somewhere. Anyway, since I didn’t have a checklist to work off, I went right to the posture-four checklist and ran it. I heard the word ‘nuclear’ and thought the crews should be heading to the ramp.”
Tyler nodded agreement. Most of SAC’s forces were positioned at the discretion of the National Command Authority, either directly or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as military advisers to the White House. Although Tyler could position his forces in almost any way he felt prudent, most of his decisions came from guidance or direct orders from the President or the Secretary of Defense, in the form of DEFCON, or Defense Configuration, orders. But in any case, especially when communications had broken down or the President wasn’t in the position to make decisions like this, Tyler had the responsibility to see his men and machines were ready to fight. He did this by setting postures for SAC alert forces. “Good decision,” Tyler told Stanczek. “I wonder what the hell the Pentagon is waiting on?” Sounds like nobody was doing anything, Tyler thought — they didn’t see any incoming missiles, so everyone hesitated, waiting for someone else to act. Well, now was the time.
“Colonel Dunigan, place the force officially at posture four,” Tyler ordered. “Then get the Pentagon on the line and inform them that I upgraded the SAC alert force posture and I’m recommending a full DEFCON change.”
“Yes, sir,” Dunigan replied. Part of the awesome responsibility of CINCSAC was his control over SAC’s nuclear strike forces. It was his responsibility to keep the bombers and land-based ICBM forces safe and viable. Tyler had a long list of options, all designed to put the nuclear strike forces in the best possible position to survive an attack against the United States but to avoid unnecessarily moving too many nuclear weapons around or causing undue alarm to either the enemy or to American citizens.
Launching the bombers, either to dispersal airfields, airborne alert orbits or to their fail-safe positive control orbits, probably wasn’t warranted yet. What was warranted, however, was stepping up everyone’s overall readiness a couple of notches until the White House and the Pentagon figured out what was going on. That should have been automatic as soon as they discovered that it was in fact a nuclear explosion, but at least now it was getting done.
