DUCKSTEIN: The FÜHRER personally……… our sorties.
KASSEL: Did he order the sorties?
DUCKSTEIN: No, he didn’t do that but he stopped one sortie.
KASSEL: Why?
DUCKSTEIN: As in precautionary measure in case there was something else afoot. It has happened several times that the FÜHRER has personally interfered with our sorties.
KASSEL: How do you know the FÜHRER did that?
DUCKSTEIN: Because he takes an interest in everything.505
It is clear from this dialogue that First Sergeant Kassel finds it unusual that Hitler would have personally ordered the sorties of Duckstein’s unit. Duckstein, in turn, invents or cites reasons to make what he has said seem plausible. His final argument, that Hitler concerns himself with everything, serves to reduce cognitive dissonance by reinvesting trust. The more Duckstein claims that the Führer is personally concerned, the more intensely Duckstein himself has to believe that idea.
As confidence in German victory disintegrated, many soldiers also developed a sense of sympathy with Hitler, which was based on conspiracy theories. “I’m sorry for the FÜHRER, the poor devil never sleeps peacefully,” one POW said. “His intentions were good, but what a government!”506 Another seconded that sentiment:
ERFURTH: How frightful! What trouble that poor man (HITLER) takes and how he is always disappointed! The way everyone lets him down!507
This, too, was a way of making reality cohere with wishful thinking and expectations. Even high-level officers were not immune to this way of thinking, as dialogue between Major Ulrich Boes and one of his peers demonstrates:
BRINCK*: Yes, what is the FÜHRER doing all the time?
BOES: He? He’s working—hard, in fact.
BRINCK: I beg your pardon?
BOES: He’s working quite hard.508
“Throughout the world we have made only enemies, not one single friend. GERMANY alone to rule the world! ADOLF is the twilight of the Gods.”509
In light of the theory of cognitive dissonance, it is hardly surprising that, even after the German debacle at Stalingrad, POWs would say things like: “We are sure to win the war. I should like to see the person who would refuse to fulfill any demand of the FÜHRER.”510 It is interesting to see how soldiers resolved such sentiments with their nagging doubts as to Hitler’s military acumen. On June 28, 1942, at the start of the Wehrmacht’s second major offensive in southern Russia, two Luftwaffe lieutenants racked their brains over what was going on inside the Führer:
