Wehrmacht soldiers may have differed from one another in a number of respects, but their basic frame of reference remained quite consistent. It is only when we begin to make international comparisons that we discover major differences in this regard. The central point of reference for Italian soldiers, for instance, was neither the nation nor the state nor indeed the military itself. Italian fascism pushed corruption and nepotism to the extreme. Italian historian Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi writes: “Other countries—for example England or Germany, closed ranks in an hour of great peril and rallied around institutions, performing a feat of utmost resistance on behalf of a cause they saw as crucial to the welfare of the entire collective. By contrast, in Italy, the social network completely collapsed, as in times of extreme crisis, the attitude became ‘every man for himself.’”730
Italian soldiers never succeeded in finding any great sense of purpose in doing battle. They lacked not only a positive self-image, but also military triumphs and an officer corps that could communicate values such as bravery, devotion to duty, and steely resilience. The officer corps was seen as an incompetent, cowardly clique, whose members had attained their posts through nepotism, not merit. Italian officers were only enthusiastic about war, the prevailing view held, as long as they themselves didn’t have to fight. Their main motivation, if we believe a conversation between two Italian POWs in the British camp Wilton Park, was personal enrichment:
FICALLA: The officers were a gang of thieves, you had to protect the men against them grimly; from colonels downwards; after a bombardment of MARSALA, the whole of one of my artillery N.O. pushed off in lorries to loot the town, and I reported that. Apart from those who did it on a big scale, even the junior officers, the lieutenants and second lieutenants used to do it; when the meat ration for the troops arrived, they would pinch whole beefsteaks which they ate in their quarters or sent home as presents etc.—I heard all sorts of stories about that. And then there was the soap—they used to take ten cakes home when they went on leave, and sugar too etc.
SALZA: I was told that by the Americans and the English, and some of our men told us about it too.
FICALLA: The men all know about it too, but no divisional commander. I couldn’t punish every case because there were so many things one never saw. When that is the sort of atmosphere prevailing, it doesn’t make any difference if the troops are good, as our men are on the whole.731
Appeals to the bravery of common Italian soldiers were cheap and likely fell on deaf ears. Italian POWs recorded in the surveillance protocols repeatedly state that the officers were the first to flee when the going got rough.732 Admiral Priamo Leonardi, the commander of the fortifications at Augusta, opined: “If people see that the whole H.Q. staff pushes off somewhere else they say: ‘Why should we stay here? Are we really such fools? Let’s all push off.’”733 Leonardi himself doesn’t seem to have been particularly concerned about defending Augusta, admitting that he had considered slinking away disguised as a civilian. “In the end,” he reasoned, “if everyone else marches off, there’s no reason the admiral shouldn’t flee as well.”734
Some German generals may have thought and behaved in similar fashion. Major General Sattler, for instance, had tried to flee the fortifications at Cherbourg in a speedboat in 1944, and when his escape failed, he immediately capitulated. Still, it would have been unimaginable for him to confess his lack of heroism to his fellow POWs. Members of the Wehrmacht and in particular high-ranking officers always tried to depict themselves as professional, upstanding soldiers. No one would have dared raise questions, as Leonardi voluntarily did, about the core of every true soldier’s self-image, his own bravery.
