Molotov had been present every single time Litvinov was summoned to the Little Corner between 1935 and 1939, with a mere two exceptions.242 The chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars did not hide his antipathy for the foreign affairs commissar. Zhdanov, whom Stalin had made head of the Supreme Soviet commission for foreign affairs, a platform for spewing additional venom about dens of foreign spies, was perhaps even more rabid in his dislike. A Russian nationalist whose virulently anticapitalist, anti-imperialist speeches appeared frequently in the press, Zhdanov came to be seen as the public antipode to the cosmopolitan, multilingual Litvinov. He publicly condemned the mutual assistance pact with France—the linchpin of Litvinov’s foreign policy.243 Still, Zhdanov worked in Leningrad, and Molotov was by far the most frequent presence in Stalin’s Little Corner—logging three times the total hours of the next closest visitors (Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Beria, Mikoyan). In fact, Molotov not only met Stalin alone often but was present at three quarters of all recorded gatherings in the Little Corner. Few others in that regime, if any, could have borne the weight of such proximity to Stalin.
Stalin had long been directing foreign policy himself from his Little Corner, relying upon the NKVD, military intelligence, the Comintern, special envoys, and Molotov as head of government and member of the politburo commission on foreign policy.244 The despot summoned foreign affairs commissariat staff and ambassadors from abroad without Litvinov being present, and he had ignored Litvinov’s warnings about intervening in Spain and much else. Litvinov must have feared for his own life.245 Two terror waves had pulverized his commissariat, the first in spring 1937, the second in spring 1938 (which targeted those who had worked with him yet remained at large).246 Foreigners looked to Litvinov’s fortunes as a key to unlocking the enigma of Soviet foreign policy.247 During the 1939 May Day parade, Stalin allowed him to appear atop the Lenin Mausoleum for all to see.248 The next day, Maisky, in London, ruminating on the Soviet proposal for a grand alliance with Britain and France, concluded that “acceptance by the British Government can scarcely be doubted.”249 But that very night, Beria and Dekanozov, along with Molotov and Malenkov, arrived at the foreign affairs commissariat, in the form of a “Central committee commission,” to interrogate the staff. Litvinov was forced to observe the humiliation.250 On May 3, Litvinov received the British ambassador calmly, and Seeds, belatedly, answered the Soviet alliance proposal by reporting that Whitehall had still not come to a decision—after a fortnight.251 That same evening, in Stalin’s Little Corner, yet another flaying of collective security took place. As Litvinov sat there impassively, Molotov lost his composure, shouting as Litvinov departed, “You think we are all fools.”252
During the Little Corner gathering, Beria had slipped out at 5:05 p.m., ten minutes before Litvinov was admitted. NKVD troops proceeded to surround the foreign affairs commissariat building on Blacksmith Bridge, diagonally across from the back side of Lubyanka. At 11:00 that night, Kremlin staff dispatched a coded message to Soviet ambassadors—which, unusually, was signed by Stalin himself—noting Litvinov’s “disloyal attitude to the Council of People’s Commissars” and the acceptance of his “request” to be relieved of his duties.253 On the morning of May 4, at the foreign affairs commissariat, Molotov announced that he was taking over. In Litvinov’s old office, he had to sort through his state papers, which lay in a disorganized pile, many unread, some smeared in butter from sandwiches—the kind of disarray the fastidious Molotov found especially distasteful.
Litvinov’s 1939 dismissal marked Stalin’s full emancipation from the foreign policy “specialists.”254 Unlike many Bolsheviks of his vintage, such as Litvinov, Molotov had never been part of the foreign emigration in Europe.255 Also unlike Litvinov, Molotov enjoyed direct access to Soviet intelligence agencies, which he would employ alongside regular channels of diplomacy.256 Among the cast of top minions, Molotov, further, was uniquely self-assured. “I would say,” Khrushchev later recalled, “that he was the only person in the politburo who opposed Stalin on this or that question for the second time.”257 Georgy Zhukov, the military commander, later recalled that “at times it reached the point where Stalin raised his voice and even lost all self-control, and Molotov, smiling, rose from behind the table and held firm to his point of view.” Zhukov added that Molotov “exerted a serious influence on Stalin, especially in foreign policy questions, in which Stalin at that time, before the war, considered him [Molotov] as competent.”258
A ROUTED, TRANSFORMED COMMISSARIAT