Stalin had not reckoned with the depth of hostility among the Western powers and the League, failing to consult even the rump experts who had survived his massacres.146 Nor had he reckoned fully with the negative repercussions of his relationship with Germany. The Soviet invasion of Finland put Hitler in an awkward spot. The German populace had no knowledge of the 1939 Pact’s secret protocol granting Finland to a Soviet sphere of influence; what they did know was that fellow “Nordic people” were under attack and that Hitler condoned and aided the aggression. German officials, beginning with the ambassador in Helsinki, tried to change Germany’s policy, and some of their complaints reached the Führer, who, in fact, personally sympathized with the Finns. But German diplomats were instructed, more than once, to avoid an anti-Soviet tone even in private conversations on Finland, while arms shipments for Finland from Italy and Hungary were turned back at German ports. In a further outrage, Germany found itself hurriedly evacuating the
The Far East, too, had to be watched. Sorge had reported (November 25, 1939) on discussions among the Japanese general staff about possibly dividing China into three spheres of influence: Japan (northeast, center), the USSR (northwest), and Chiang Kai-shek’s Chongqing government (southeast). But in contrast his deal with Hitler over Poland, Stalin never sought to partition China with another power. In any case, as the Chinese Communist party reported to Moscow, the Japanese soon began concentrating additional troops in Manchukuo.148
Worst of all, Stalin’s Finnish People’s Government prevented him from accepting the feelers from the new government in Helsinki. Already on the second day of war, the intransigents in the government who were against a deal had been swept aside, replaced by Finns ready to negotiate many of the concessions that he sought.149 Finnish politicians, it turned out, had required a show of force in order to agree to a version of Stalin’s proposed land-exchange deal and military basing. Wars are won partly with agile responses to unexpected twists and turns but, above all, with political planning in conjunction with military action. “War,” as Clausewitz had explained, “should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.” Had the Soviet attack been cleverly designed as a quick, massive blow, followed by a pause and a demand for immediate return to the political bargaining table, it might have worked after a few days.150 But such a cunning stratagem would have required a level of subtlety that Stalin, not to mention the broken men around him, lacked. Instead, what transpired was a Soviet catastrophe.151 “Papa and Mama,” a Soviet soldier wrote, in one of the hundreds of letters excerpted in Beria’s NKVD reports submitted to the Little Corner, “our army has met enormous resistance. . . . This is a devil’s patch, which tanks cannot cross, [instead] sinking in the swamps.”152
BIRTHDAY BASH
In 1939 and 1940, Stalin authorized 2,000 visits to his office, the peak in his three decades in power. He met foreign officials in Molotov’s office as well, and had a hand in additional meetings in Mikoyan’s office (to iron out details with German trade representatives).153 The sessions in the Little Corner frequently stretched to seven hours or more; many ran past midnight, and sometimes until 3:00 a.m. Now, as gallant little Finland attracted the sympathy of the whole world, the Little Corner became even tenser than it had been during the border war with Japan or the high-stakes poker with Hitler and the partition of Poland. Perhaps the stress and long hours took a toll: Stalin had an outbreak of his chronic fevers, streptococcus, and staphylococcus, as well as sore throats. Germany’s lightning conquest of Poland was fresh in people’s minds and made for a devastating contrast to the awkward Soviet thrust into Finland. Adding insult to injury, Schulenburg relayed a German offer to assist the Soviets militarily. “You can imagine it!” recalled Khrushchev. “Hitler was demonstrating our weakness, and he wanted us to admit it by accepting his aid. A feeling of alarm grew in the Soviet leadership.”154