130. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 606–7; DBFP, 2nd series, VII: 222 (Strang to Marquess of Reading); Davies, Crisis and Progress, 121n80. Strang surmised that a stable capitalism was a sine qua non for the success of socialism in the USSR. See also New York Times, Dec. 6, 1931, and Jan. 10, 1932. Some foreigners knew better: Le Temps, Nov. 23, 1931 (L. Vitin). The British came to understand that the Germans would not let the Soviets default: British Documents on Foreign Affairs, part II, series A, X: 377, XVI: 4–5.
131. The year 1931 would mark a peak for Soviet industrial imports, when the USSR accounted for 27.5 percent of U.S. industrial exports and 80 percent of German engineering exports. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky.” Cloth imports fell from more than 10 million meters to under 1 million. Lewis, “Foreign Economic Relations,” 208. The year 1932 would turn out to be the worst in the history of Soviet foreign trade because of higher tariffs abroad and decreased credit availability.
132. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 626–7. See also Tauger, “1932 Harvest,” 88n52.
133. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 86 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 119). On Sept. 4, Stalin complained to Kaganovich that “you are putting every kind of pressure for the export of grain when they pay pennies for grain,” suggesting instead they export butter; Kaganovich recommended no changes for now. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 80–1 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 16–9), 83–6 (f. 558, op. 11, d. 739, l. 76–87: Sept. 6).
134. Kurliandskii, Stalin, vlast’, religiia, 233–463, 610–28.
135. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 54–7 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 739, l. 28–39), 60 (d. 76, l. 30–1); Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 85 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 128, 153), 88–91 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 479, l. 267; d. 484, l. 43, 47ob., 45, 53, 53ob., 54, 55, 55ob., 61; d. 481, l. 123); Kondrashin and Penner, Golod, 116 (RGAE, f. 7496, op. 37 d. 159, l. 98).
136. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 69 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 484, l. 60).
137. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 75 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 53–5: Stalin mocking V. V. Ptukha). Pravda’s coverage of the plenum did not mention the discussion of grain procurement, in which regional party bosses condemned incompetence in harvest gathering and mass theft of the grain. Mikoyan interjected that collective farmers needed to be told: “first, satisfy the state plan, then satisfy your own plan.” Oskolkov, Golod 1932/1933, 17–9 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 119).
138. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 88, 90–1 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 481, l. 123, 55ob., 61), 96–7.
139. In 1926–27 the average market price per centner for rye had been 7.53 rubles while the state price had been 4.31. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 93 (citing Tovarooborot, 1932: 140–45).
140. Kondrashin and Penner, Golod, 121 (citing RGAE, osobaia papka Kolkhoztsentra). No date is given.
141. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 255–6 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 54). Stalin received twenty people that day, an unusually large number; the last departed at 5:10 p.m. He was back in the office the next day. Na prieme, 79–80.
142. The incident occurred near Ilinka 5/2 across from the Old Gostinny Dvor. Ogarev’s real name was said to be Platonov-Petin, and he was identified as an aide to the British intelligence station chief responsible for the border states that used to be part of imperial Russia. On the OGPU report, Molotov wrote: “To the members of the politburo: comrade Stalin needs to cease walking on foot in Moscow.” Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, and Rykov affixed their signatures. This might have helped accelerate Stalin’s own move permanently into the Kremlin. “Agent angliiskoi razvedki sluchayno vstretil Vas . . . ,” 161–2 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 226, l. 18, 19: Nov. 18, 1931); Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 286. APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 200, l. 147.
143. Japanese patriots extolled their country as a liberating conqueror, while the army leadership and many civilian supporters cast Manchuria’s takeover as a matter of national survival. Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity. It took “more than ministers and generals to make an empire.” Young, Total Empire, 8. Japanese casualties occurred mostly in a diversionary action over Shanghai.
