Stalin полностью

472. Ellman, “Role of Leadership Perceptions,” 824. P. Blonskii, a doctor from Kiev province, wrote in a letter to the health commissar of Ukraine, which the police intercepted and excerpted, that “the politically harmful ‘theory’ that the starving people themselves are responsible for the famine is prevalent among leaders and rank-and-file workers; it is claimed that they did not want to work, so in that case, let them die—no pity there.” Antipova et al., Golod v SSSR, 384–6 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 11, d. 56, l. 203–5).

473. Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 75 (citing Molot, March 10, 1933); Zelenin, “Kolkhoznoe stroitel’stvo v SSSR,” 28–9 (citing GARP, f. 3316, d. 815, l. 4; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 21, d. 2415, l. 1181ob.); “Kollektivizatsiia: istoki, suchnost’, posledtsviia,” 46–56.

474. Davies and Wheatcroft persuasively refute Ellman’s assertions that Stalin intentionally starved peasants, concluding: “We regard the policy of rapid industrialisation as an underlying cause of the agricultural troubles of the early 1930s, and we do not believe that the Chinese or NEP versions of industrialisation were viable in Soviet national and international circumstances.” Davies and Wheatcroft, “Reply to Ellman,” 626. Robert Conquest wrote the principal book on the supposedly intentional famine—Harvest of Sorrow (1986)—but in a letter to Davies (Sept. 7, 2003), he acknowledged that Stalin did not intentionally cause the famine. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 441n145. Kuromiya noted there was no evidence to support intentionality. “Stalin does not appear to have anticipated the deaths of millions of people,” he concluded. “The millions of deaths de-stabilised the country politically and generated political doubt about his leadership even within the party (most famously the Ryutin Platform).” Kuromiya, “The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933 Reconsidered,” 667.

475. Merl, “Entfachte Stalin die Hungersnot?”

476. For Ukraine, the initial procurement target had been 5.83 million tons (May 6, 1932), which was lowered to 5.17 million (Aug. 17, 1932), then to 4.22 million (Oct. 30, 1932), and finally to 3.77 million tons (Jan. 12, 1933); actual collections amounted to 3.59 million. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 123, 137 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 131–5), 478. For the North Caucasus, the quota was reduced overall from 2.52 to 1.59 million tons.

477. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 478; Davies et al., Economic Transformation, 290 (table 22). See also Lewin, Making of the Soviet System (1985), 151.

478. Tauger, “1932 Harvest,” 74 (table 2).

479. Davies and Wheatcroft, “Reply to Ellman,” 627–8; Gintsburg, “Massovyi golod,” 124, 126.

480. One Ukrainian scholar correctly conceded that in Ukraine, ethnic Russians and Jews died in lesser proportion than ethnic Ukrainians partly because the former lived in greater proportion in cities. Kul’chyts’kyi, “Skil’ky nas zahynulo pid holodomoru 1933 roku?,” 15. A decree of Dec. 14, 1932, enjoined the authorities in Soviet Ukraine “to direct serious attention to the correct implementation of Ukrainianization, eliminate a mechanical implementation, chase out Petlyura-ites and other bourgeois-nationalists elements from party and soviet organizations, thoroughly select and rear Ukrainian Bolshevik cadres, furnish systematic party leadership and control over the implementation of Ukrainianization.” A follow-up decree of Dec. 26 ended Ukrainianization in the neighboring Kuban region of the RSFSR. Brian Boeck has demonstrated that Ukrainianization in the Kuban was opposed by the populace, who preferred a Cossack or Kuban identity, and by local officials. He also shows that Kaganovich seized upon, and twisted, a single report by a local official about a single Cossack settlement (Poltavskaya) that blamed supposedly successful Ukrainianization as a cause of resistance. “Thus,” Boeck concludes, “there is no compelling evidence that the success of Ukrainianization, or the Central Committee’s perceptions of the success of Ukrainianization, led to the decree of 14 December.” Boeck, “Complicating the National Interpretation,” 31–48; Pyrih et al., Holod, 291–4 (Tsentral’nyi gos. Arkhiv obshchestvennykh obedeinenii Ukrainy, f. 39, op. 4, d. 1, l. 8–10); Trapeznikov, Istoricheskii opyt KPSS, 262. A related decree was issued for Belorussia: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 917, l. 7 (Dec. 19, 1932).